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Abstract 
Cyberbullying, or humiliating people using the Internet, has existed almost since the beginning of 
Internet communication. The relatively recent introduction of smartphones and tablet computers has 
caused cyberbullying to evolve into a serious social problem. In Japan, members of a parent-teacher 
association (PTA) attempted to address the problem by scanning the Internet for cyberbullying 
entries. To help these PTA members and other interested parties confront this difficult task we 
propose a novel method for automatic detection of malicious Internet content. This method is based 
on a combinatorial approach resembling brute-force search algorithms, but applied in language 
classification. The method extracts sophisticated patterns from sentences and uses them in 
classification. The experiments performed on actual cyberbullying data reveal an advantage of our 
method vis-à-vis previous methods. Next, we implemented the method into an application for 
Android smartphones to automatically detect possible harmful content in messages. The method 
performed well in the Android environment, but still needs to be optimized for time efficiency in 
order to be used in practice. 
Keywords: Automatic Cyberbullying Detection, Natural Language Processing, Language 
Combinatorics. 
Choon-Ling Sia was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on April 8, 2016 and went through 
four rounds of revisions.  
1 Introduction 
Information technology contributions to the 
preservation, support, and development of public 
health are numerous. Recent ones along these lines 
include analysis and prediction of the spread of 
epidemics (Aramaki, Maskawa, & Morita, 2011), 
analysis of health data (Buntin, Burke, Hoaglin, & 
Blumenthal, 2011; Kitajima, Rzepka, & Araki, 2014) 
and construction of biomedical ontologies (Smith et al. 
2005). However, while most of these contributions 
address the physical sphere of public health, the mental 
or psychological aspect, although equally important, 
has been mostly disregarded. 
In recent years the problem of unethical behavior in the 
cyber-environment has been revealed. This has greatly 
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impaired public mental health in adults and especially 
in children. Specifically, this problem has been termed 
cyberbullying, which is defined as the exploitation of 
open online means of communication, such as Internet 
forum boards, or social network services (SNS), in 
order to convey harmful and disturbing information 
about private individuals, often children and young 
adults. 
Although attempting to humiliate and slander 
individuals by means of the Internet has existed almost 
as long as the Internet itself, with the popularity of 
devices such as smartphones and tablet computers, 
cyberbullying can now take place anytime and 
anywhere. Different access points and the ease of 
Internet anonymity have further exacerbated this 
problem. 
Messages classifiable as cyberbullying include, for 
example, ridiculing someone’s personality, body, or 
appearance as well as slandering or spreading rumors. 
Some cases of cyberbullying have led to victims self-
harming or even attempting suicide, or have led to 
attacks on the offenders. In the US, this issue attracted 
a great deal of attention beginning in 2006 after a 13-
year-old girl from Missouri committed suicide after 
receiving bullying messages on Myspace. 1  Similar 
cases have been observed in other countries, including 
Japan, which is the context of this research. The 
growing number of cyberbullying cases around the 
world has stimulated public debate about whether early 
detection could prevent such tragedies and on the 
freedom of speech on the Internet, in general (Leets 
2001). 
In Japan, the problem has become serious enough to 
garner attention from the Ministry of Education 
(MEXT 2008). In 2007 Japanese school employees 
and members of parent-teacher associations (PTA) 2 
have started monitoring activities under the general 
name Internet Patrol (“net-patrol,” for short) to detect 
websites containing such inappropriate content. 
However, net-patrol is performed manually by 
volunteers. The vast amount of Internet data make this 
an uphill battle. 
Concern for the victims of cyberbullying motivated us 
to begin a long-term project that we hope will 
contribute to detecting, preventing, and ultimately 
solving the problem of cyberbullying. In the present 
research we, first, aim to develop a systematic 
approach to automatically detect and classify 
cyberbullying entries, which would help and ease the 
burden of net-patrol members. One of the goals of the 
project is to create a net-patrol solution by 
automatically detecting cyberbullying entries on the 
web and reporting them to the appropriate authorities.  
 
1 https://myspace.com/ 
Second, we hope to contribute to the prevention of the 
problem by transferring the cyberbullying detection 
mechanism onto a mobile device. We developed a test 
application for Android devices, to test whether it is 
possible to apply detecting algorithms (typically used 
on much more powerful machines) on mobile devices 
such as smartphones. The first results of our study and 
its possible implications are described in this paper.  
The method proposed in this paper is original in the 
following regards. As previous research has pointed 
out (Ptaszynski et al. 2010), the language used in 
cyberbullying messages is often deceptive and messy, 
and it is difficult to craft a simple set of features to 
detect it. Therefore, to create a flexible cyberbullying 
model, we applied a novel automatic feature extraction 
procedure. In research on machine learning—in 
particular, research on machine learning used to solve 
real-world problems—one can use one of two 
approaches for feature extraction: automatic feature 
extraction (i.e., bottom-up approach) or the selection 
of custom predefined features (i.e., top-down 
approach) including, for example, creating a lexicon, 
etc.). The latter approach, although sometimes 
providing satisfying results, requires deep knowledge 
of the problem, meaning that the researchers must 
identify the valid features themselves, which is often 
inefficient.  
In the vast majority of relevant research that applies the 
bottom-up approach, the features automatically 
extracted are typically based on separate words (e.g., 
bag-of-words approaches) (Ptaszynski et al., 2010). 
Though this strategy employs simple words that could 
be used to classify text such as parts of speech or 
concepts (Sahlgren and Cöster 2004), the 
sophistication of the extracted pattern never exceeds 
one token. A smaller number of studies applies n-
grams (usually unigrams to tetragrams of words or 
letters) (Damashek 1995, Ponte and Croft 1998, Siu 
and Ostendorf 2000).  
Recently researchers have started to apply skipgrams, 
which are slightly more generalized versions of n-
grams (D. Guthrie, Allison, Liu, L. Guthrie, & Wilks, 
2006) that allow one controlled “skip,” or a gap. This, 
however, still falls short of the definition of a pattern 
for the purpose of our research, in that it allows any 
number of “skips” with a flexible dynamic distance, 
which in mathematical terms refers to “ordered 
combinations without repetitions.” Up to this point, 
this kind of pattern extraction has not been widely 
applied due to the computational cost it requires. The 
method proposed here takes advantage of recent 
computing technologies that offer multiple cores and 
large amounts of memory to overcome this problem 
and efficiently compute such patterns. We believe this 
method of feature extraction will identify features with 
2 An organization composed of parents and school personnel. 
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a level of sophistication previously unseen in 
cyberbullying detection research. 
In terms of methodology, this paper follows general 
principles of design science research in information 
systems (Gregor & Hevner, 2013, Hevner, March, 
Park, & Ram, 2004) in that it aims to develop a novel 
artifact (in particular a mechanism for cyberbullying 
detection in the form of a smartphone application) to 
address a real-world problem (cyberbullying). The 
paper also follows the publication schema for a design 
science research study (Gregor & Hevner, 2013) as 
outlined below.  
First, we define the problem of cyberbullying and 
present some of the previous related research. We also 
describe other available cyberbullying detection 
solutions and explain how our software is different 
from other cyberbullying detection software available 
on the market. Next, we describe our method and the 
data set used in this research. We explain the 
evaluation settings and thoroughly analyze and discuss 
the results. Then, we describe the smartphone 
application we use to implement the mechanism we 
developed. We describe the functions, elements, and 
interface of the application. Finally, we describe the 
preliminary testing intended to verify the performance 
of the developed application and discuss the test 
results. 
2 Background 
2.1 Cyberbullying: A Social Problem 
The problem of harmful and offensive messages on the 
Internet has existed for many years. One reason for 
such activities is that the anonymity of Internet 
communication gives users the feeling that malicious 
behavior will go unpunished. Recently the problem has 
been officially defined and labeled as cyberbullying. 
The US National Crime Prevention Council states that 
cyberbullying happens “when the Internet, cell phones 
or other devices are used to send or post text or images 
intended to hurt or embarrass another person” 
(http://www.ncpc.org/cyberbullying). 
Some of the early robust research on cyberbullying 
was done by Hinduja and Patchin, who performed 
numerous surveys about the subject in the US (Patchin 
& Hinduja, 2006, Hinduja & Patchin, 2009). They 
found that harmful information may include threats, 
sexual remarks, pejorative labels, and/or false 
statements aimed at humiliating others. When posted 
on a social network such as Facebook, Twitter, or an 
Internet forum, it may disclose humiliating personal 
data associated with a victim, personally defaming and 
ridiculing.  
From around 2009 to 2011, a number of large-scale 
questionnaire studies and social campaigns were 
conducted to measure the occurrence of cyberbullying 
and to investigate methods of mitigating the problem. 
For example, Cross et al. (2009) in Australia (Cross et 
al., 2009) found that cyberbullying affected around 
5%-8% of children in Australian schools, depending 
on the grade. Comparable results have been found in 
the United States (Kowalski & Limber, 2007), Finland 
(Sourander et al., 2010), and across Europe 
(Hasebrink, 2011). Hasebrink et al. (2009), in 
particular, present even larger estimates, stating that up 
to one in five young people (not limited to the school 
environment) have likely experienced bullying or 
harassment through the Internet or on mobile devices. 
These estimates have also been confirmed by Li 
(2007), Pyżalski (2012), and more recently by Kann et 
al. (2014).  
Cyberbullying has also been thoroughly studied and 
analyzed by Dooley, Pyżalski, and Cross (2009), 
Dooley et al. (2009), who performed an in-depth 
comparative analysis of traditional face-to-face 
bullying and cyberbullying, and by Lazuras, Pyżalski, 
Barkoukis, and Tsorbazoudis (2012), who discussed 
the implications of cyberbullying for teachers in school 
environments.  Dooley, Pyżalski, and Cross, in 
particular, point out some of the similarities between 
cyberbullying and traditional face-to-face bullying, but 
also mention some of the differences that make 
cyberbullying a more difficult problem to contain. The 
similarities, which contribute to classifying the 
problem as a type of bullying. For example, both types 
of bullying involve peer groups—e.g., classmates in 
face-to-face bullying or “friend groups on social 
networking sites. Also, all bullying involves repetitive 
attacks, though cyberbully attacks are often more 
frequent than face-to-face attacks. Finally, bullying 
involves an imbalance of power. Typically, one 
person, or a small group of people, are bullied by a 
much larger number of bullies. This feature also 
distinguishes bullying from other types of 
cyberaggression.  
However, the environment and the tools used can also 
make cyberbullying an even more humiliating 
experience than its face-to-face counterpart. For 
example, with the use of Internet, cyberbullying can 
occur on much larger scale, potentially transforming it 
into a completely overwhelming experience.
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Figure 1. Internet Patrol Process 
Also, with the popularity of social network services, 
humiliating a person publicly—for instance, on their 
official Facebook homepage—may make the attack 
visible to general public, rather than to a limited number 
of viewers. In worst-case scenarios, attacks could even 
appear in search engine results, significantly 
magnifying its visibility. Additionally, the indirect 
nature of online relationships is associated with a sense 
of emotional detachment, making it less likely that 
Internet bystanders will respond to protect the victim 
and potentially increasing a bully’s sense of impunity.  
In Japan, after several cyberbullying victims committed 
suicide to escape online humiliation, the Japanese 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (MEXT) considered the problem serious 
enough to begin a movement against it. In a manual 
devoted to handling cyberbullying cases (MEXT, 
2008), the ministry places great importance on the early 
detection of suspicious entries, especially on social 
networking services and informal school websites. 
MEXT distinguishes the following several types of 
cyberbullying detected in Japan.  
1. Cyberbullying appearing on BBS forums, blogs 
and on private profile websites: 
a. Entries containing libelous, slanderous, or 
abusive contents; 
b. Disclosing personal data of natural persons 
without their authorization; 
c. Entries and humiliating online activities 
performed in the name of another person. 
2. Cyberbullying appearing in electronic mail: 
a. E-mails directed to a certain person/child, 
containing libelous, slanderous or abusive 
contents; 
b. E-mails in the form of chain letters containing 
libelous, slanderous or abusive contents; 
 
3 http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/m_hisho06_00034.html 
c. E-mails sent in the name of another person, 
containing humiliating contents. 
For this research we focus mostly on cases of 
cyberbullying that appear on informal websites 
associated with Japanese secondary schools. These are 
websites where pupils exchange information about 
coursework, tests, etc. However, such pages witnessed 
a rapid increase in cyberbullying toward pupils and 
even teachers (Watanabe & Sunayama, 2006), making 
other users potentially hesitant to use the sites and 
causing other undesirable consequences.  
The Internet Patrol movement was founded to deal with 
this specific problem. Its participants are typically 
teachers and PTA members. Based on the MEXT 
definition of cyberbullying, they read through all 
Internet contents, and if they find a harmful entry they 
send a deletion request to the web page administrator 
and report the event to appropriate authorities, such as 
the Police or Legal Affairs Bureau. 3  The typical 
Internet Patrol process is presented in Figure 1.  
Unfortunately, net-patrol is presently performed 
manually as voluntary work. This process includes 
reading countless Internet entries, determining whether 
any are potentially harmful, printing out or taking 
photos of the relevant pages, and sending deletion 
requests and reports to appropriate organs. With the 
number of entries growing every day, surveilling the 
entire web is an uphill battle for the small number of 
net-patrol members. Moreover, the task potentially 
places a great mental health burden on the net-patrol 
members. Our research aims to create a tool allowing 
for the automatic detection of cyberbullying on the 
Internet in order to ease the burden carried by net-patrol 
volunteers and, potentially, other groups with similar 
goals.  
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2.2 Previous Research in Automatic 
Cyberbullying Detection 
Although the problem of cyberbullying has been 
studied in the social sciences and the field of child 
psychology for over ten years, there have been only few 
attempts to detect and study the problem using methods 
from the field of artificial intelligence (AI) or natural 
language processing (NLP). Below we present the most 
relevant research to date and also summarize the 
publications in Table 1. We mostly focused on journal 
publications, since they represent the most mature state 
of research.  
The first journal publication written on the topic of 
automatic cyberbullying detection, cyberbullying 
analysis, and mitigation using methods from the fields 
of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and natural 
language processing was by Ptaszynski et al. (2010). 
They performed affect analysis of a small data set of 
cyberbullying entries to find out that a distinctive 
feature of cyberbullying was the use of profane 
language . They applied a lexicon of such words to train 
an SVM classifier. With a number of optimizations, the 
system was able to detect cyberbullying with 88.2% of 
the F-score. However, increasing the data diminished 
their results, resulting in them abandoning SVMs as not 
ideal for dealing with the frequent language ambiguities 
that are typical for cyberbullying events.  
Later, Ishisaka and Yamamoto (2010) developed a 
dictionary of abusive expressions based on a large 
Japanese BBS (electronic bulletin board system, a type 
of electronic forum) called 2channel. In their research 
they labeled words and paragraphs that the speaker 
explicitly used to insult other people—for example, 
words and phrases like baka (“stupid”) or masugomi no 
kuzu (“trash of mass media”). Based on which words 
appeared most often as abusive vocabulary, they 
extracted abusive expressions from the surrounding 
context. Unfortunately, their method, based on a 4-
gram model did not extract a sufficient number of 
abusive words, with both Precision and Recall scoring 
at around 30% or less.  
Ikeda, Yanagihara, Matsumoto, and Takishima (2010) 
manually collected a set of separate harmful and 
nonharmful sentences. Based on word occurrence 
within the corpus, they created a list of keywords to 
classify harmful content. Their method, based on 
keyword matching in input documents, selected 
documents as harmful if the number of harmful words 
found within them was higher than a preset threshold. 
To deal with the small Recall associated with the 
method they applied a semantic generalization of 
documents and based their matching on generalized 
dependency chunks within input sentences. The highest 
Precision produced by this method was around 60%, 
with approximately 35% Recall. Unfortunately, they 
mostly struggled with variations of the same 
expressions that differed in only one or two 
characters—for example, bakuha (“blow up”) and 
baku–ha (“blooow up”). All variations of the same 
expression needed to be collected manually, which was 
a weakness of the method.  
Fujii, Ando, and Ito (2010) proposed a system for 
detecting documents containing excessive sexual 
language using the concept of distance between two 
words in a sentence. They defined “black words” as 
harmful—i.e., words proximal to words that appear 
only in a harmful context, rather than those that appear 
in both harmful and nonharmful contexts (i.e., “gray 
words”).  
Hashimoto, Kinoshita, and Harada (2010) proposed a 
method for detecting the harmful meaning of separate 
words used in jargon. In their method they assumed that 
the nonstandard meaning of a word is determined by the 
words surrounding the word in question. They detected 
the harmful meaning based on calculating the co-
occurrence of a word with surrounding words.  
In another study, Matsuba, Masui, Kawai, and Isu. 
(2011) proposed a method to automatically detect 
harmful entries online that involved extending the SO-
PMI-IR score (Turney, 2002) to calculate the relevance 
of a document with harmful contents. Using a small 
number of seed words, they were able to apply their 
method to a large number of documents, predicting 
which documents were harmful with an accuracy of 
83% (based on test data).  
Later, Nitta et al. (2013) proposed an improvement to 
Matsuba et al.’s (2011) method. They grouped the seed 
words into three categories (abusive, violent, and 
obscene) to calculate the SO-PMI-IR score and 
maximized the relevance of the different categories. 
Their method scored much higher than the original 
method proposed by Matsuba et al. Nitta et al. based 
their information retrieval procedure on the Yahoo! 
search engine API. However, Ptaszynski et al.’s (2016) 
reevaluation of the method, performed two years after 
the original paper, showed a major drop in Precision 
(about 30 percentage points) over two years. Below, in 
a comparison of our method with previous methods, we 
discuss possible reasons for such changes, 
hypothesizing that these changes could have been 
caused by changes in information available on the 
Internet (e.g., web page re-rankings, changes in user 
policies, etc.). In any case, Ptaszynski et al. (2016) 
achieved considerable success in trying to further 
improve the method by automatically acquiring and 
filtering harmful new seed words. Due to similarities in 
applied data sets and experimental settings, we used all 
three of the above methods (Matsuba et al. 2011, Nitta 
et al. 2013, Ptaszynski et al. 2016) as comparisons with 
the method proposed in this paper.  
All the above research was done for Japanese-language 
applications. For English-language applications, 
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research in the topics related to cyberbullying detection 
begun around 2012 with Sood, Churchill, and Antin’s 
(2012) research. However, Sood et al. did not yet 
recognize the full negative weight of harmful online 
content. The major problem they focused on was 
personal insults—they assumed that the negative 
influence of this could, at most, cause the Internet 
community to stop growing or fall into recession. This 
would suggest that in 2012, the problem of 
cyberbullying and its consequences had not yet been 
fully recognized by the US scientific community. 
Nevertheless, Sood et al. (2012) focused on the 
detection of personal insults on the Internet as an aspect 
of standard community management procedures. Their 
research used single words and bigrams as features, 
weighting them using either presence (feature present 
in input or not 1/0), frequency, or tf-idf, and used them 
to train an SVM classifier. As a data set they used a 
corpus of 6,000 entries they had collected from various 
online forums. As the gold standard for their 
experiments, they used a crowd-sourcing approach with 
untrained layperson annotators hired for a classification 
task through Mechanical Turk.  
Later, Dinakar, Jones, Havasi, Lieberman, and Picard 
(2012) proposed their approach for the detection and 
mitigation of cyberbullying. An improvement of their 
study, in comparison to previous research, was its wider 
perspective. Dinakar et al. (2012) not only focused on 
the detection of cyberbullying, they also proposed some 
methods for mitigation. A disadvantage of this 
research, compared to previous work, was the 
experimental settings. Dinakar et al. assumed a focus 
on cyberbullying; however, they did not define the 
concept strictly enough and, in effect, focused not on 
the detection of cyberbullying, but rather on detecting 
entries containing sexual or racial harassment. While 
these often overlap with cyberbullying, they do not 
reflect the whole problem. To prepare the data set for 
experiments, like Sood et al. (2012), Dinker et al. 
applied Mechanical Turk to entries and comments from 
YouTube and Formspring, thus formulating the 
problem as a task for layperson annotators, even though 
the sophistication of the problem required expert 
annotators. Despite the lacks concerning overall 
research settings, the classifiers they used scored up to 
58-77% of the F-score depending on the kind of 
harassment content they detected. Their best proposed 
classifier was based on support vector machines, which 
confirmed for English the research done previously by 
Ptaszynski et al. for Japanese in 2010.  
At the same time that Nitta et al. (2013) proposed their 
extended SO-PMI-IR method for cyberbullying 
detection, Cano, He, Liu, and Zhao (2013) proposed 
their violence detection model, a weakly supervised 
Bayesian model. They did not, however, focus strictly 
on cyberbullying, but widened their scope to more 
generally understood “violence.” This approach to 
problem formulation made it understandable, thus 
making it feasible for annotation by laypersons, 
allowing them to study the problem without needing to 
consult experts for help annotating their data sets. The 
training data sets were extracted from violence-related 
topics on Twitter and DBPedia and the model was 
tested on Twitter.  
Marathe & Shirsat (2015) applied a Naive Bayes 
classifier to detect cyberbullying comments on 
YouTube. They first searched for videos promoting 
cyberbullying (the search was done subjectively). Next, 
they extracted features related to those videos, such as 
video metadata (time stamp, duration, popularity), bag-
of-words extracted from video title, description, 
comments, and profiles of users who uploaded the 
videos. Then, they built a character n-gram model based 
on such features and trained the Naive Bayes classifier 
to detect whether a new input video (or its metadata) 
relates to cyberbullying. Although neither their data 
collection approach nor their results could be 
considered state of the art, the idea to include a context 
wider than a simple bag-of-words approach is 
noteworthy. 
Sarna & Bhatia (2017) proposed categorization of 
cyberbullying messages into direct and indirect 
bullying. They based their method on a set of features 
like “bad words,” as well as words indicating positive 
or negative sentiment and other common features like 
pronouns and proper nouns to estimate user credibility. 
They used a top-down approach for feature extraction 
and assumed some features correlated with 
cyberbullying (e.g., “bad words” or emotion words). 
They applied those features to classify messages into 
direct bullying, indirect bullying, and nonbullying with 
the use of four standard classifiers (Naive Bayes, kNN, 
decision trees, SVM). The results of the classification 
were further used in the user behavior analysis model, 
which provided the output for analysis of user 
credibility. An interesting part of their research was that 
they immediately recognized that cyberbullying can be 
performed directly in the form of insults as well as 
indirectly, in other linguistic forms like irony, jokes, or 
rumors. Unfortunately, in practice, Sarna & Bhatia 
(2017) only focused on messages that contained “bad 
words” (which they also failed to specify in the paper), 
thus undermining their primary assumption. The 
problem with their research was that they did not 
provide any detailed information about the data set they 
used (except that it was from Twitter), nor did they 
explain how they performed the annotation of the data 
set (by expert or layperson annotators). Therefore, a 
direct comparison to their method, as well as its 
objective evaluation, remains problematic.
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Table 1. Summary of Previous Research in Cyberbullying Detection. 
References 
Processing 
language  
Feature extraction method Classification method 
Ptaszynski et al., 2010 Japanese Unigrams (BoW) SVM 
Ishisaka & Yamamoto, 
2010 
Japanese 4-grams n-gram language model matching 
Ikeda et al., 2010 Japanese Unigrams (harmful single words) keyword matching 
Fujii et al., 2010 Japanese 
Unigrams co-occurring with sexting 
“black” and “gray” words 
keyword matching 
Hashimoto et al., 2010 Japanese Separate words 
surrounding word co-occurrence 
with harmful words 
Matsuba et al., 2011 Japanese 9-seed words 
SO-PMI-IR averaged for all seed 
words 
Sood et al., 2012 English Unigrams, bigrams, stems 
SVM, various weighting (presence, 
freq, tf-idf) 
Dinakar et al., 2012 English 
Unigrams, handcrafted word lists 
(Ortony lexicon of negative words, 
profane words, frequently occurring 
stereotypical words), POS 
SVM, JRip, Naive Bayes, J48 
Nitta et al., 2013 Japanese 
seed words grouped into three 
categories  
SO-PMI-IR maximized for category 
Cano et al., 2013 English 
Violence-related words (derived from 
violence-related topics from Twitter 
and DBPedia) 
violence detection model (weakly 
supervised Bayesian model) 
Marathe & Shirsat, 2015 English 
BoW, video metadata (time stamp, 
popularity), character n-grams 
Naive Bayes 
Ptaszynski et al., 2016 Japanese 
Seed words grouped into three 
categories  
SO-PMI-IR maximized for category 
with seed word optimization 
Sarna & Bhatia, 2017 English (?) 
“Bad words,” positive- and negative- 
sentiment words, pronouns, proper 
nouns, links 
Naive Bayes, kNN, decision trees, 
SVM 
2.2.1 Research Gaps 
Based on the above literary review, we recognized the 
following research gaps, or areas for improvement, in 
cyberbullying detection research: 
(1) Data set preparation. Most of the 
abovementioned methods suffer from unprofessional 
or subjective data preparation. In some research, such 
as that by Cano et al. (2013) or Dinakar et al. (2012), 
the data sets were indeed collected with sufficient 
scrutiny (e.g., using Mechanical Turk or applying an 
already existing available data set), although they did 
not define the problem ideally. The problem of 
cyberbullying is a complex social phenomenon and 
data representing its samples need to be handled by 
expert annotators. Some researchers, like Ishisaka & 
Yamamoto (2010), Sood et al. (2012) or Cano et al. 
(2013) recognize this difficulty in defining the 
problem, and formulate it in other terms, so the use of 
experts is not needed, and thus focus on, for example, 
detecting generally perceived violence or aggression. 
Some researchers use the term cyberbullying, although 
what they actually focus on—for example, sexual or 
racial harassment—overlaps with but is not equivalent 
to cyberbullying. On the other hand, other research, 
such as Sarna & Bhatia (2017) or Marathe & Shirsat 
(2015), collects the data sets ad hoc and with no 
specific standardization. Of all the relevant research, 
the studies by Ptaszynski et al. (2010), Matsuba et al. 
(2011), Nitta et al. (2013) and Ptaszynski et al. (2016) 
were the only ones that defined the cyberbullying 
problem with proper depth and made the effort to 
collect data sets using sufficient scrutiny and 
standardization. They obtained their data sets from an 
official source—namely, from a Japanese branch of the 
Human Rights Center, which collected the data fully 
labeled by Internet Patrol members actively involved 
in searching for cyberbullying cases on the Internet, 
based on an official governmental definition of 
cyberbullying (MEXT 2008).  
(2) Feature extraction. Almost all of the reviewed 
research included only words (tokens, unigrams), or n-
grams as features, at best. Some research (Matsuba et 
al.2011, Nitta et al. 2013) applied only a small number 
of features, while others (Dinakar et al. 2012, Marathe 
& Shirsat 2015) built up more complex models, which, 
however, still did not exceed a simple bag-of-words 
model. Moreover, research, such as Matsuba et al. 
(2011), Ishisaka & Yamamoto (2010), Nitta et al. 
(2013), Sarna & Bhatia (2017) used only top-down 
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selected features. While, to some extent, it is 
reasonable to apply top-down features in automatic 
cyberbullying detection—for example, in the case of 
violent or obscene words—top-down feature selection 
requires time and extensive effort and background 
knowledge about the data set, and thus tends to be 
inefficient with limited practicality. Moreover, some 
research disregarded significant findings of other 
previous research. For example, Ptaszynski et al. 
(2010) recognized with sufficient certainty that 
emotion-related words are not effective in 
cyberbullying detection, but Sarna & Bhatia (2017) 
still put great weight on using positive and negative 
sentiment words in their classification. To allow full 
comparison to previous research, our research also 
allows for simple bag-of-words and n-gram models. 
However, in contrast to all previous research, we also 
apply a novel and sophisticated idea of combinatorial 
patterns extracted automatically from training 
sentences.  
(3) Classification methods. Previous research tested 
many different classifiers, such as SVMs, Naive 
Bayes, or decision trees. However, in most cases, 
SVMs attained the highest scores. Interestingly, 
despite Ptaszynski et al. (2010) concluding that SVMs, 
especially those trained on BoW, are not ideal for 
grasping the sophistication of language used in 
cyberbullying, in most of later research, when 
comparing various classifiers, the researchers obtained 
their highest scores precisely for SVMs. Therefore, 
this research also used SVMs for comparison with our 
proposed method. Furthermore, one major 
disadvantage of traditional machine learning is the fact 
that although one can set groups of specific features 
that influence the results, it is not possible to specify 
which feature in which case scenario influenced the 
acquired result. The method proposed in this paper is 
capable of providing such information, which could be 
useful in further filtering and optimizing the features 
for other specific cyberbullying data sets.  
(4) Human effort reduction. In our research we 
aimed at minimizing human effort. Most of the 
previous studies assumed that using vulgar words as 
seeds would help detect cyberbullying, even though 
they all recognized that vulgar words are only one kind 
of distinctive vocabulary and do not cover all cases. 
We assumed that this kind of vocabulary could be 
extracted automatically. Moreover, we did not restrict 
the scope to words (unigrams, tokens), or even phrases 
(n-grams). We extended the search to sophisticated 
patterns with disjointed elements. To achieve this, we 
developed a pattern extraction method based on the 
idea of a brute-force search algorithm, which, although 
being computationally heavy in the training phase, 
 
4 https://sourceforge.net/projects/fearnot/ 
5 http://www.bullyguardpro.com 
removes most of the workload from the researchers 
and provides a method capable of replacing the efforts 
of Internet Patrol members seeking Internet 
cyberbullying entries. 
2.3 Related Work in the Development of 
Practical Applications 
With the popularization of mobile devices, the problem 
of cyberbullying has become increasingly apparent. 
Apart from the research in automatic cyberbullying 
detection described above, a number of research teams 
around the world have attempted to develop practical 
solutions for the detection and mitigation of this 
problem (Ptaszynski et al., 2010; Dinakar et al., 2012; 
Nitta et al., 2013; Kontostathis, Reynolds, Garron, and 
Edwards, 2013). However, most of the research is still 
in a developmental phase and is yet to be fully applied 
in practice. On the other hand, market software 
solutions for the detection and mitigation of online 
bullying have been developed and have the potential 
capacity to deal with the problem to some extent. 
Unfortunately, such solutions are usually based on 
simple methods, thus narrowing the scope of their 
applicability. Below we summarize some of these:  
FearNot! One example of a software using a novel 
approach is FearNot!4 The authors describe it as “an 
interactive drama/video game that teaches children 
strategies to prevent bullying and social exclusion.” 
The development of this software, which uses a 
psychology-inspired AI character, was supported by 
the EU-funded research projects Victec and eCircus. 
The approach taken by the developers—namely, to not 
detect and stigmatize cyberbullying behavior but, 
rather, to educate children on how not to become 
bullies, does indicate deep insight into the problem. 
Unfortunately, the development of the software 
stopped in early 2013.  
BullyGuardPro. BullyGuardPro5 is an example of a 
potentially effective software solution that is aimed at 
detecting cyberbullying activity around a user by 
allowing the user to “effectively respond, diffuse and 
halt cyberbullying and cyberpredation attacks.” The 
software was developed by Lynne Edwards and April 
Kontostathis, who lead one of the first teams to 
research cyberbullying detection (Kontostathis et al., 
2013). Unfortunately, at the time of writing, no details 
on the technology used in the software or its release 
date were available.  
Samaritans Radar. On October 29, 2014, 
“Samaritans,” 6  an organization focused on suicide 
prevention, launched an application called Samaritans 
Radar. It was a free Internet application for Twitter, 
which helped users monitor their friends’ tweets. The 
6 http://www.samaritans.org/ 
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main function of the application was to alert users if it 
detected anyone in a user’s online surroundings, who 
might be a bullying victim, depressed, or who was 
sending disturbing suicidal signals. Unfortunately, due 
to serious data protection and privacy issues, 
recognized by users soon after the launch, the 
application closed permanently on March 2015.  
Uonevu. An interesting approach to the detection of 
cyberbullying in messages has been developed by 
researchers from Trinity College, Dublin and the 
National Anti-Bullying Research and Support Centre, 
under the codename Uonevu (meaning “bullying” in 
Swahili). The software is meant to detect particularly 
nonliteral forms of bullying and negative stereotyping. 
The software works by applying a semantic knowledge 
base in order to associate concepts with each other. An 
example is associating the concept of “fat/obese 
people” with the word “pizza,” which in a sentence 
such as “Hey, Jane, are you going to eat a whole pizza 
tonight?” would indicate cyberbullying. The major 
problem here becomes creating a large enough 
knowledge base of stereotypes. Unfortunately, at the 
time of writing, the database contained only 57 
stereotypes, and is thus not sufficient for the effective 
functioning of the software. However, the project is 
still in its developmental phase and could be an 
interesting solution once finished.  
Twitter New Policy. On February 26, 2015, Twitter 
independently released its new policy regarding safety 
and misbehavior among its users. 7  Twitter allowed 
users to report particular tweets as harassment 
incidents. This provided users who became victims of 
online bullying with a tool to personally respond to 
bullying attacks. The account of a confirmed bully is 
locked and can be reopened only under the condition 
that the bully deletes any harmful tweets. This way of 
dealing with cyberbullying is not yet a software per se, 
but Twitter aims to detect bullying messages 
automatically in the future. For the time being, 
however, they are increasing the number of support 
staff devoted to handling abuse reports.  
ReThink. An example of a recent popular solution that  
would still work today is ReThink,8 an application for 
smartphones that shows a pop-up warning message 
when user tries to send a message containing harmful 
content. The idea of informing a user about the 
possible harmfulness of a message has been 
recognized in the research as an effective means of 
making a user reevaluate his or her message before 
making it publicly available (Masui et al., 2013; Patent 
Application No. 2013-245813). Unfortunately, 
 
7 https://blog.twitter.com/2015/update-on-user-safety-features 
8 http://www.rethinkwords.com/ 
although ReThink is a good example of a quick and ad 
hoc response to the cyberbullying problem—its 
algorithm for the detection of harmful contents is based 
on simple keystroke logging and detecting vulgar and 
harmful words within a string of characters. This 
makes it incapable of detecting more sophisticated 
contents that do not include vulgar expressions. It also 
fails when user makes a mistake during writing and, 
for example, uses a backspace, since the “backspace” 
character is also recorded and hinders the detection of 
harmful words.  
PocketGuardian. PocketGuardian is a newer 
(released September 2015) example of software for 
parental monitoring, which “detects cyberbullying, 
sexting, and explicit images on children’s mobile 
devices.”9 By using machine learning techniques, the 
software provides a statistical probability that the 
content (sentence, tweet, e-mail, or image) is 
inappropriate. An advantage of this software is that it 
focuses not only on textual content but also includes in 
its monitoring range the ability to detect explicit 
images. A disadvantage could be its price ($12.99 per 
month). The exact technology behind the software 
(e.g., applied machine learning algorithms, size of the 
training lexicon or corpus) is yet unknown. Moreover, 
as the software is aimed at parents trying to monitor 
their children’s mobile devices, the developers will 
need to address questions regarding ethics of using 
such software and its influence on the parent-child trust 
relationship.  
In comparison with the software described above, the 
application presented later in this paper distinguishes 
itself in the following ways. Similarly to ReThink, it 
provides a tool for the user to reflect on their own 
written messages. However, in contrast to ReThink, it 
shows the user which exact words or sentence patterns 
were considered inappropriate. Moreover, it uses not 
only simple keystroke logs, but also various artificial 
intelligence methods (at present, two) to spot any 
undesirable contents. Our application focuses only on 
textual contents—however, in contrast to 
PocketGuardian, we do not intend to make a profit off 
the application. Moreover, since the application is 
intended to be employed by the user directly, all ethical 
issues and any influence on parent-child trust 
relations—as well as any privacy issues, like those 
confronted in the Samaritans Radar application—are 
unlikely to arise. The method we propose has been 
under development for over six years—thus, the 
problem of insufficient data, plaguing, for example, the 
Uonevu project, is also resolved.
9 https://gopocketguardian.com/ 
Sentence Pattern Extortion for Cyberbullying Detection  
 
1084 
 
Figure 2. A Graphical Summary of the Whole Method. 
3 Sentence Pattern Extortion 
Method Description 
In this section we explain all parts of the proposed 
method, step by step. At first, we describe general 
types of features we apply in this research and explain 
our feature extraction method. Next, we describe all 
methods of weight calculation for the applied features. 
Then, we present the applied classifiers. Finally, we 
describe the threshold optimization as a method to 
optimize the classifier performance. A graphical 
summary of the whole method is presented in Figure 
2. 
3.1 Sophistication of Language Model 
Features applied in building a language model for 
classification can, in general, be viewed from two 
different points of view. First, the general 
sophistication of all features must be addressed. This 
applies to whether the applied features represent single 
words/tokens, or n-grams (sequences of tokens), or 
some other more sophisticated kinds of patterns. 
Second, a specific kind of information encoded in 
features needs to be recognized. For example, features 
can consist of words, but also of lemmas (undeclined 
dictionary form of words), parts of speech (POS), etc. 
Combinations of those types of information are also 
allowed. For example, it is possible to use combined 
features of words with POS, or lemmas with POS.  
Using lemmas with POS, being more related to the data 
set rather than to the method itself, will be explained 
further in Section 3.2 below. We first turn our attention 
to using combined features of words with POS, as this 
constitutes the core of the method.  
The computationally simplest language model is called 
bag-of-words (BoW) (Harris, 1954). It considers a 
piece of text or document as an unordered collection of 
words, thus disregarding grammar and word order. 
Although recently a generalization of the BoW model 
has been proposed using semantic concepts instead of 
words (bag-of-concepts) (Cambria & Hussain 2012, 
Raymond et al. 2012) or an aspect-query model (Song, 
Huang, Bruza, & Lau, 2012), the general rule remains 
the same—namely, that the order of elements within 
the input, as well as longer strings of elements (e.g., 
phrases), are disregarded.  
One important approach retaining the significance of 
word order is broadly called the n-gram approach. In 
terms of probabilistic theory, its basis was first 
formulated by Markov (1971). The n-gram approach 
perceives a given input (e.g., a sentence) as a set of n-
long ordered subsequences of words. This allows 
matching the words while retaining the sentence word 
order. However, the n-gram approach, when applied to 
language, still allows only for simple sequence 
matching, disregarding more sophisticated sentence 
structure. 
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Table 2. Comparison of Capabilities of Different Language Models oo Capture Certain Patterns from a 
Hypothetical Corpus Consisting of Two Sentences, (1) and (2)a 
Pattern 
Model 
BoW N-gram Skip-gram LC 
John  ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ 
John went  × ◯ ◯ ◯ 
John * to × × ◯ ◯ 
John * school × × × ◯ 
John * to * today × × × ◯ 
Note: ◯ = capable, × = incapable. 
aSentence (1) and (2) are as follows: 
(1) John went to school today.  
(2) John went to this awful place many people tend to generously call school today.  
 
An example of such a sophisticated pattern can be 
explained as follows. The following sentence (in 
Japanese) Kyō wa nante kimochi ii hi nanda ! (What a 
pleasant day it is today!) contains a common and 
widely studied language pattern nante * nanda ! 10 
Similar cases can be easily found in other languages; 
for instance, in English, the exclamative sentence “Oh, 
she is so pretty, isn’t she?” contains a pattern “Oh * is 
so * isn’t *?,” which is a typical example of a wh-
exclamative sentence pattern (Beijer, 2002, Potts & 
Schwarz, 2008). The existence of such patterns in 
language is common and well recognized. However, it 
is not possible to discover them using an n-gram 
approach.  
An example of a language model that aims to go 
beyond BoW and n-grams is the skip-gram model 
(sometimes also called skipped n-gram or distanced n-
gram). It assumes that some words within an n-gram 
might not be adjacent, that they are skipped over. In 
theory, this should allow extraction of most of frequent 
language patterns from a corpus. However, there are 
some major drawbacks in research studying skip-gram 
modeling. These include, for example, assuming that a 
skip can appear only in one place (Huang, Alleva, Hon, 
Hwang, & Rosenfeld, 1992). The above-mentioned 
English sentence example clearly indicates that 
frequent and easily recognizable language patterns can 
consist of elements appearing variously at the 
beginning of a sentence, in the middle of a sentence, or 
at the end of the sentence, depending on the situation. 
Multiple gaps between them are also common, and 
these are not covered by the skip-gram language 
model.  
 
10  Equivalent to wh-exclamatives in English (Sasai 2006, 
Beijer 2002); asterisk “*” used as a marker of disjointed 
elements. 
11  In this research “frequent pattern” means a combination 
occurring in a corpus at least twice. This differs from the 
traditional approach to building BoW language models, where 
all extracted words are generally used, even if their occurrence 
is equal to 1 because single words usually do not have high 
occurrence rates and most of such cases are rare. Therefore, 
Moreover, the number of skipped elements is recorded 
for each gap. For example, a 2-skip-3-gram can only 
allow 2 skips (omitting two words) between the 
elements, which means that the model considers as 
different patterns two cases in which the first gap has 
2 skips and the second has 5 skips. Since the model 
assumes full control of the skip-length, the 2-skip-3-
gram and 5-skip-3-gram consisting of the same 
elements (words) are represented as different entities 
and can never refer to the same pattern in a corpus. 
This assumption is unrealistic, since one can easily 
imagine that the same pattern, appearing in two 
sentences of different lengths, will be separated by 
gaps of different sizes. To illustrate this problem, in 
Table 2 we compare which of the above-mentioned 
language models are capable of discovering particular 
patterns present in the two sentences below. The last 
column on the right represents the capability of the 
language model based on the idea of language 
combinatorics (LC), applied in this research.  
(1) John went to school today.  
(2) John went to this awful place many 
people tend to generously call school today.  
The language modeling method discussed in this paper 
is capable of dealing with any of the sophisticated 
patterns. This is due to the fact that we define sentence 
pattern as any ordered nonrepeated frequently 
occurring combination of sentence elements. This 
definition allows extraction of all possible frequent11 
meaningful linguistic patterns from unrestricted text. 
not using all words, or using only those with occurrence = 2 or 
higher, could significantly decrease the Recall rate in the 
classification process (not many features would be found). 
With sophisticated patterns, however, words are extracted in 
large numbers and using all of them would make the 
classification process inefficient. By using the above cut-off 
rate, we conform to the general definition of “a pattern” (as 
something that appears “at least twice”), eliminate the least 
useful patterns, and retain those which appear most often. 
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3.2 Feature Extraction with Language 
Combinatorics 
To extract the patterns of cyberbullying messages we 
first applied the idea of language combinatorics 
(Ptaszynski et al. 2011). This idea assumes that 
linguistic entities such as sentences can be perceived 
as bundles of ordered nonrepeated combinations of 
elements (words, punctuation marks, etc.). 
Furthermore, the most frequent combinations 
appearing in many different sentences can be defined 
as sentence patterns.  
We assumed that for the task of cyberbullying 
detection, where actual harmful meaning is often 
hidden and indirect, applying sophisticated patterns 
with disjointed elements should provide better results 
than the usual bag-of-words or n-gram approach. As 
long as patterns are defined as ordered combinations of 
sentence elements, they could be automatically 
extracted by generating all ordered combinations of 
sentence elements, verifying their occurrences within 
a corpus, and filtering out those combinations which 
appear only once.  
Algorithms using such combinatorial approaches 
initially generate a massive number of combinations / 
potential answers to a given problem. This is the reason 
they are sometimes called brute-force search 
algorithms. The brute-force approach often faces the 
problem of exponential and rapid growth of function 
values during combinatorial manipulations. This 
phenomenon is known as combinatorial explosion 
(Krippendorff, 1986). Since this phenomenon often 
results in very long processing time, combinatorial 
approaches have been often disregarded. We assumed 
however, that combinatorial explosion can be dealt 
with on modern hardware to the extent needed in our 
research. Moreover, optimizing the combinatorial 
approach algorithm specifically to the problem 
requirements should shorten the processing time 
making it advantageous in the task of processing 
harmful language.  
From the fact that the method first extracts all possible 
patterns from a sentence with a brute-force-inspired 
algorithm, we call the method pattern extortion, to 
distinguish it from typical pattern extraction methods 
based on n-grams or single tokens.  
In particular, this method, first, orders nonrepeated 
combinations generated from all elements of all input 
sentences in a training set. In every n-element 
sentence there is k-number of combination clusters, 
such as that 1 ≦ k ≦ n, where k represents all k-
element combinations being a subset of n. The 
number of combinations generated for one k-element 
cluster of combinations is equal to a binomial 
coefficient, represented in Equation 1. In this 
procedure, the system creates all combinations for all 
values of k from the range of {1, … , n}. Therefore, 
the number of all combinations is equal to the sum of 
combinations from all k-element clusters of 
combinations, like in Equation 2.  
( 1 ) 
(
𝑛
𝑘
) =
𝑛!
𝑘! (𝑛 − 𝑘)!
 
 
( 2 ) 
∑ (
𝑛
𝑘
)
𝑛
𝑘=1
=
𝑛!
1! (𝑛 − 1)!
+
𝑛!
2! (𝑛 − 2)!
+ ⋯ +
𝑛!
𝑛! (𝑛 − 𝑛)!
= 2𝑛 − 1 
Next, all nonsubsequent elements are separated with an 
asterisk (“*”). All patterns generated this way are used 
to extract frequent patterns appearing in a given 
corpus. Exact examples of patterns created from one 
sentence are represented in Figure 3.  
For comparison, we also applied more traditional n-
gram and BoW-based language models. In a 
classification experiment we used BoW for traditional 
classifiers applied in previous research, and n-grams 
and sophisticated patterns for the proposed classifier. 
It was not possible to apply sophisticated patterns in 
traditional classifiers such as SVMs because of an 
incomparably large number of patterns generated by 
the proposed methods, as compared to only single 
words in BoW model. Consequently, great amounts of 
computational power would be required, making the 
method unpractical and inefficient, especially since the 
exact patterns influencing the results would still not be 
accessible with SVMs and other classifiers.
Example: What a nice day ! 
5-el. pattern: 4-el. pattern: 3-el. pattern: 2-el. pattern: 1-el. pattern: 
What a nice day ! What a nice * ! a nice * ! What a What 
 What a nice day * What a nice What * ! a 
 What a * day ! What a * ! nice * ! nice 
 … … … … 
no. of patterns: (1) (5) (10) (10) (5) 
 
Figure 3. Examples of Various Length (i.e., Number of Elements) Patterns Extracted from One Sentence. 
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3.3 Weight Calculation 
After combinatorial patterns are extracted, their 
occurrences O are calculated separately for the positive 
side (positive, meaning “harmful”) Opos and the 
negative side (negative, meaning “nonharmful”) side 
Oneg. The occurrences of each pattern j are further used 
to calculate normalized pattern weight wj according to 
Equation 3, which is a simplified sigmoid function 
normalizing the weight score between 1 (completely 
harmful) and -1 (completely nonharmful). 
( 3 ) 
𝑤𝑗 = (
𝑂𝑝𝑜𝑠
𝑂𝑝𝑜𝑠 + 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑔
− 0.5) ∗ 2 
The weight can be calculated in several ways. Two 
features are important in weight calculation. A pattern 
is more representative for a corpus when it is, first, 
longer (length k) and, second, appears frequently in the 
corpus (occurrence O). Thus, the weight can be 
modified by  
• awarding length (LA) by multiplying 
normalized weight wj by pattern length kj , 
which provides a weight with awarded length 
wLA, like in Equation 4, or  
• awarding length and occurrence (LOA) by 
multiplying normalized weight wj by pattern 
length kj and overall pattern occurrence (Opos 
+Oneg), which provides a weight with awarded 
length and occurrence wLOA, like in Equation 5. 
 
( 4 ) 
𝑤𝐿𝐴 = 𝑤𝑗 ∗ 𝑘𝑗 
 
( 5 ) 
𝑤𝐿𝑂𝐴 = 𝑤𝑗 ∗ 𝑘𝑗 ∗ (𝑂𝑝𝑜𝑠 + 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑔) 
The list of frequent patterns generated in the process 
of pattern generation and extraction can be also further 
modified. When two collections of sentences of 
opposite features (such as “positive vs. negative” or 
“harmful vs. nonharmful”) are compared, a generated 
list of patterns will contain patterns that appear 
uniquely on only one side (e.g., uniquely positive 
 
12 By ambiguous patterns we mean those patterns that appear 
on both the harmful side and the nonharmful side. If a pattern 
appears on both sides it is ambiguous (more ambiguous, or 
less ambiguous depending on the score) whether it is harmful 
or nonharmful and its normalized weight is in the range of 
0.99(9) to -0.99(9). Moreover, if an ambiguous pattern 
appears on both sides in the same occurrence, then its weight 
is equal 0, and is thus called a zero-pattern. 
13 We also performed the classification with the use of skip-
grams. Unfortunately, skip-grams failed completely. Due to 
patterns and uniquely negative patterns) or on both 
sides (i.e., ambiguous patterns). Therefore, the pattern 
list can be further modified by 
• erasing all ambiguous patterns12 (AMB), or 
• erasing only ambiguous patterns which appear 
in the same number on both sides (“zero- 
patterns,” or 0P).  
Moreover, a list of patterns will contain both the 
sophisticated patterns (with disjointed elements) as 
well as more common n-grams. Therefore, the 
experiments on the proposed method were performed 
with both  
• patterns (PAT), and  
• n-grams (NGR) only.13 
For the model based on BoW, we also applied a 
traditional weight calculation scheme—namely, term 
frequency divided by document frequency (tf*idf). 
Term frequency tf(t,d) refers here to the traditional raw 
frequency, meaning the number of times a term t 
(word, token) occurs in a document d. Inverse 
document frequency idf(t,D) is the logarithm of the 
total number of documents |D| in the corpus divided by 
the number of documents containing the term nt , as in 
Equation 6.  
( 6 ) 
𝑖𝑑𝑓(𝑡, 𝐷) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔
|𝐷|
𝑛𝑡
 
Finally, tf*idf refers to term frequency divided by 
document frequency or, in other words, multiplied by 
inverse document frequency. 
3.4 Classification 
The proposed classifier is a function defined as a sum 
of weights of patterns found in the sentence, like in 
Equation 7. 
( 7 ) 
score = ∑ 𝑤𝑗 , (1 ≥ 𝑤𝑗 ≥ −1) 
It produces a harmfulness score for each analyzed 
sentence. The score alone does not yet specify whether 
a sentence can be considered harmful or not; however, 
their construction, according to which even almost identical 
patterns are considered as completely different if the number 
of skips is different, or the skip-length is different, skip-
grams need a very large data set to collect enough even 
somewhat frequent features (actual skip-gram instances). 
With our assumption that a pattern is “something that appears 
at least twice in a corpus,” there were no skip-grams 
available to be used in classification. 
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a good guess is that the more above zero the score, the 
more harmful patterns it contains or, to put it more 
clearly, the more it resembles a style of writing usually 
found in cyberbullying. On the other hand, the more 
below zero the score, the more it resembles a 
nonharmful way of writing. However, this instinctive 
rule of thumb, with zero as a universal threshold, does 
not apply to pattern-based methods, since even a one-
word difference in a sentence can produce a much 
larger number of patterns on one of the sides (harmful 
or nonharmful), thus causing an imbalance in the data. 
Therefore, we also performed a threshold optimization 
to specify which threshold should be used for the 
applied data. 
Apart from the above, for the classification we also 
used other methods based on various classifiers for 
comparison, such as SVM, Naive Bayes, JRip, J48, or 
kNN, applied previously in other research (Ptaszynski 
et al., 2010; Sood et al., 2012; Dinakar et al., 2012; 
Sarna & Bhatia, 2017; Marathe & Shirsat, 2015), and 
SO-PMI-IR, which has also frequently been applied in 
previous research (Matsuba et al., 2011; Nitta et al., 
2013; Ptaszynski et al., 2016). 
3.5 Threshold Optimization and Heuristic 
Rules 
If the initial collection of sentences is biased toward 
one of the sides (e.g., more sentences of one kind, or 
the sentences were longer, etc.), there will be 
significantly more patterns of a certain kind. Thus, to 
avoid bias in the results, instead of applying a static 
rule of thumb, the threshold was optimized 
automatically.  
All the above settings were automatically verified in 
the process of evaluation, based on 10-fold cross- 
validation, in order to choose the best model. The 
training in 10-fold cross-validation was done 
separately for each fold. Namely, the training was 
performed ten times, each time on different data parts 
and with test data completely unrelated to the training 
data. The metrics used in evaluation were standard: 
Precision (P), Recall (R), balanced F-score (F), and 
Accuracy (A). These scores were calculated for every 
threshold and compared to choose the optimal model.  
Finally, to deal with the combinatorial explosion 
mentioned at the beginning of this section we applied 
two heuristic rules. In the preliminary experiments we 
found that the most valuable (frequently appearing) 
patterns in language are up to six elements long. Thus, 
we limited the scope of pattern extraction to k ≤ 6. As 
such, the procedure of pattern generation (1) generates 
up to six element-patterns, or (2) terminates at the point 
where no frequent patterns were found. 
 
14 http://www.pref.mie.lg.jp/jinkenc/hp/ 
4 Evaluation Experiment 
4.1 Data Set 
We first needed to prepare a data set. We used the data 
set created originally by Matsuba, Masui, Kawai, Isu 
(2010) and developed further by Matsuba et al. (2011). 
The data set was also used by Ptaszynski et al. (2010), 
Nitta et al. (2013), and recently by Ptaszynski et al. 
(2016). It contains 1,490 harmful and 1,508 
nonharmful entries. The original data were provided by 
the Human Rights Research Institute Against All 
Forms for Discrimination and Racism in Mie 
Prefecture, Japan14 and contains data from unofficial 
school websites and forums. The harmful and 
nonharmful sentences were manually labeled by 
Internet Patrol members according to official 
instructions included in the MEXT manual for dealing 
with cyberbullying (MEXT 2008). Some of these 
instructions are briefly summarized below.  
The MEXT definition assumes that cyberbullying 
happens when a person is personally offended online. 
This may include disclosing the person’s name, 
personal information, and other details related to 
privacy concerns. Therefore, as the first feature 
distinguishable for cyberbullying, MEXT defines 
private names. This includes information such as: 
• Private names and surnames (e.g. “Michal 
Ptaszynski”), 
◦ When a person’s name can be clearly 
distinguished 
•  Initials and nicknames (e.g. “Mr. P.”, “Mi*al 
Ptasz*ski”) 
◦ When a person’s identity can be clearly 
distinguished 
◦ When a person’s identity cannot be 
clearly distinguished 
•  Names of institutions and affiliations  
(e.g. “That foreigner professor from Kitami 
Institute of Technology”) 
◦ When a person’s identity can be clearly 
distinguished 
◦ When a person’s identity cannot be 
clearly distinguished 
As the second feature distinguishable for 
cyberbullying, MEXT defines any other type of 
personal information. This includes: 
•  Address, phone numbers, etc. (e.g. “165 Koen-
cho, Kitami, 090-8507, Japan”, or “+81-157-
26-9327”) 
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◦ When the information refers to a private 
person 
◦ When the information is public or refers 
to a public entity 
•  Questions about private persons  
(e.g. “Who is that tall foreigner wandering 
around in the Computer Science Dept. 
hallways?”) 
◦ Always considered undesirable and 
harmful, even if the object is described 
in a positive way, because such 
questions can lead to rumors.  
•  Entries revealing personal information  
(e.g. “I heard that guy is responsible for the 
new project.”). 
◦ When a person’s identity can be clearly 
distinguished 
◦ When a person’s identity cannot be 
clearly distinguished 
Furthermore, literature on cyberbullying indicates 
vulgarities as one of the most distinctive features of 
cyberbullying (Patchin & Hinduja 2006, Hinduja & 
Patchin 2009, Ptaszynski et al. 2010). Also, according 
to MEXT, vulgar language is often used in the context 
of cyberbullying due to its ability to convey offenses 
against particular individuals. Examples of such words 
in English are shit, fuck, and bitch. Examples in 
Japanese are uzai (freaking annoying) and kimoi 
(freaking ugly). In the prepared data set all entries 
containing any of the above information was classified 
as harmful. Some examples from the data set are 
represented in Table 3. 
4.2 Data Set Preprocessing: Feature 
Selection 
The proposed method uses sentences separated into 
elements (words, tokens, etc.) as an input. In the 
transcription of Japanese (the applied data set 
language) spaces (e.g., between words) are not used as 
they would be in English, for example. Therefore, we 
needed to preprocess the data set and make the 
sentences separable into elements. We did this in 
several ways to determine how the preprocessing 
would influence the results. We used MeCab, 15  a 
morphological analyzer for Japanese and CaboCha,16 a 
Japanese dependency structure analyzer, to preprocess 
the sentences from the data set in the following ways.  
• Tokenization: All words, punctuation marks, 
etc. are separated by spaces (TOK).  
 
15 http://taku910.github.io/mecab/ 
• Lemmatization: As above, but words are 
represented in their generic (dictionary) forms, 
or “lemmas” (LEM).  
• Parts of speech: Words are replaced with their 
representative parts of speech (POS).  
• Tokens with POS: Both words and POS 
information are included in one element 
(TOK+POS).  
• Lemmas with POS: As above but with lemmas 
instead of words (LEM+POS).  
• Chunks: Larger subparts of sentences divided 
by grammatical cluster—e.g., noun phrase, verb 
phrase, predicate, etc.—but without 
dependency relations (CHUNK). 
• Dependency structure: As above, but with 
information regarding how a chunk relates to 
the previous chunk, the following chunk, and to 
other chunks (DEP).  
• Chunks with named entities: Chunks with 
added information on what named entities 
(private name of a person, organization, 
numbers, etc.) appear in the sentence. The 
information is provided by the dependency 
structure analyzer (CHUNK+NER).  
• Dependency structure with named entities: 
Both dependency relations and named entities 
are provided (DEP+NER). 
Feature extraction from sentences is performed 
automatically, according to procedures explained in 
Section 3.2. Next, the language model is generated 
automatically using the extracted features. In this 
context, the data set preprocessing methods 
represented above can be understood as a feature 
selection preset for the experiment.  
Five examples of preprocessing are represented in 
Table 4. Theoretically, the more generalized a sentence 
is, the less unique patterns it will produce, but the 
produced patterns will be more frequent. This can be 
explained by comparing a tokenized sentence with its 
POS representation. For example, in the sentence from 
Table 4 we can see that a simple phrase kimochi_ii hi 
(“pleasant day”) is represented by a POS pattern as 
ADJ N. We can easily assume that there will be more 
ADJ N patterns than kimochi_ii hi, because many word 
combinations can be represented by this POS pattern. 
On the other hand, there are more words in the 
dictionary than POS labels. Therefore, POS patterns 
will be less varied but will occur more frequently. By 
comparing the results of the classification using 
different preprocessing methods, we can find out 
whether it is better to represent sentences as more 
generalized or as more specific. 
16 https://taku910.github.io/cabocha/ 
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Table 3. Four Examples of Cyberbullying Entries Gathered During Internet Patrol. 
>>104 Senzuri koi te shinu nante? sonna hageshii senzuri sugee naa. “Senzuri masutaa” toshite isshou agamete yaru yo. 
>>104 Dying by “flicking the bean”? Can’t imagine how one could do it so fiercely. I’m gonna worship her as a “master-
bator,” that’s for sure. 
2-nen no tsutsuji no onna meccha busu suki na hito barashimashoka? 1-nen no anoko desuyo ne? kimogatterunde yamete agete 
kudasai 
Wanna know who likes that awfully ugly 2nd-grade Azalea girl? It’s that 1st-grader isn’t it? He’s disgusting, so let’s leave him 
mercifully in peace. 
Aitsu wa busakute sega takai dake no onna, busakute se takai dake ya noni yatara otoko-zuki meccha tarashide panko anna 
onna owatteru 
She’s just tall and apart from that she’s so freakin’ ugly, and despite that she’s such a cock-loving slut, she’s finished already. 
Shinde kureeee, daibu kiraware-mono de yuumei, subete ga itaitashii... 
Please, dieeee, you’re so famous for being disliked by everyone, everything about you is so pathetic 
Note: The upper three sentence pairs include strong sarcasm despite the overt positive expressions in the sentences. The English translation 
corresponds to Japanese original content. Harmful patterns recognized automatically are underlined (underlining in English corresponds as 
closely to the Japanese as possible). 
Table 4. Three Examples of Preprocessing of a Sentence in Japanese 
Sentence: 今日はなんて気持ちいい日なんだ！ 
• Transcription in phonetic alphabet: Kyōwanantekimochiiihinanda!  
• Glosses: Today TOP what pleasant day COP EXCL  
• Translation: What a pleasant day it is today!  
Preprocessing Examples: 
• Tokenization: Kyō wa nante kimochiii hi nanda ! 
• POS: N PP ADV ADJ N AUX SYM 
• Tokens+POS: Kyō [N]    wa[PP]    nante[ADV]     kimochi_ii[ADJ]    hi[N]   nanda[AUX]  ![SYM]  
• Chunks: Kyō_wa       nante       kimochi_ii      hi_nanda! 
• Dependency relations: *0_3D_Kyō_wa      *1_2D_nante *2_3D_kimochi_ii     *3_-1D_hi_nanda!  
Notes: N = noun; PP = postpositional particle; ADV = adverb; ADJ = adjective; AUX = auxiliary verb; SYM = symbol; 1D, 2D, ... = depth of 
dependency relation; *0, *1, *2, ... = phrase number. 
4.3 Experiment Setup 
The preprocessed original data set provides nine 
separate training and test sets for the experiment 
(tokenized, POS-tagged, tokens with POS, lemmatized, 
lemmas with POS, chunks, dependency relations, 
chunks with named entities, dependency with named 
entities). The experiment was performed nine times, 
one time for each kind of preprocessing, in order to 
choose the best option. For each version of the data set, 
an experiment with a 10-fold cross-validation was 
performed and the results were calculated using 
standard Precision, Recall, balanced F-score, and 
Accuracy measures for each threshold within the 
whole threshold span. In one experiment 14 different 
versions of the proposed classifier were compared with 
the 10-fold cross-validation condition. Versions of the 
classifier represent combinations of weight calculation 
and pattern list modification explained in Section 3.3 
and are, in order: PAT, PAT-0P, PAT-AMB, PAT-LA, 
PAT-LA-0P, PAT-LA-AMB, PAT-LOA, NGR, NGR-0P, 
NGR-AMB, NGR-LA, NGR-LA-0P, NGR-LA-AMB, 
NGR-LOA. Additionally, we performed experiments 
using classifiers applied in previous research using the 
tf*idf weight calculation schema. Since the experiment 
is performed for nine different versions of 
preprocessing, we obtained an overall number of 1980 
experiment runs, 1260 for the proposed algorithm and 
an additional 720 for other classifiers (nine data sets * 
eight classifiers in 10-fold cross-validation). There 
were several evaluation criteria. First, we looked at 
which version of the algorithm achieved the highest 
balanced F-score, and the highest Accuracy within the 
threshold span. This is referred to as threshold 
optimization. However, theoretically, an algorithm 
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could achieve its best score for one certain threshold, 
while for others it could perform poorly. Therefore, we 
also looked at break-even points (BEP) of Precision 
and Recall. This shows which version of the algorithm 
is more balanced. Finally, we checked the statistical 
significance of the results. We used a paired T-test 
because the classification results could represent only 
one of two classes (harmful or nonharmful). To choose 
the best version of the algorithm, we separately 
compared the results achieved by each group of 
modifications; e.g., “different pattern weight 
calculations,” “pattern list modifications,” and 
“patterns vs. n-grams.” We also compared the 
performance to all applicable previous methods, which 
we considered as a baseline. This refers primarily to 
SO-PMI-IR-based methods (Matsuba et al., 2011; 
Nitta et al., 2013; Ptaszynski et al., 2016), which were 
evaluated on the same data, as well as the SVM-based 
classifier, which many previous studies selected as the 
best (e.g., Ptaszynski et al., 2010; Dinakar et al., 2012; 
Sood et al., 2012; Sarna & Bhatia 2017).
 
Table 5. Comparison of Best Precision, F-Score and Accuracy Within the Threshold Span                                
for Each Version of The Classifier for All Data Sets. 
Highest Precision within threshold 
  Pr Re F1 Acc 
Tokenized (PAT-0P/NGR-0P) 0.861 0.249 0.387 0.614 
Lemmatized (PAT-LA-0P) 0.902 0.208 0.338 0.602 
Parts-or-Speech (NGR-LA) 0.934 0.031 0.060 0.514 
Tokens+POS 
(PAT-ALL/NGR-
ALL) 
0.890 0.336 0.487 0.647 
Lemmas+POS (PAT-AMB) 0.956 0.119 0.212 0.567 
Chunks (NGR-LA-0P) 0.875 0.072 0.133 0.533 
Dependency (PAT-LA) 0.868 0.071 0.131 0.537 
Chunks+NER (NGR-ALL) 0.768 0.242 0.368 0.586 
Dependency+NER (NGR-LA) 0.718 0.010 0.020 0.513 
Highest F-score within threshold 
  Pr Re F1 Acc 
Tokenized (PAT-0P) 0.724 0.842 0.778 0.766 
Lemmatized (NGR-ALL) 0.713 0.885 0.790 0.770 
Parts-or-Speech (PAT-AMB) 0.528 0.946 0.677 0.550 
Tokens+POS (PAT-0P/NGR-0P) 0.756 0.839 0.796 0.784 
Lemmas+POS (NGR-ALL) 0.807 0.798 0.803 0.808 
Chunks 
(PAT-LA-0P/NGR-
LA-0P) 
0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
Dependency (PAT-LA/NGR-LA) 0.491 1.000 0.658 0.491 
Chunks+NER (NGR-ALL) 0.563 0.879 0.686 0.603 
Dependency+NER (NGR-0P) 0.500 0.982 0.663 0.510 
Highest Accuracy within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
Tokenized (PAT-AMB) 0.778 0.760 0.769 0.776 
Lemmatized (NGR-ALL) 0.787 0.781 0.784 0.790 
Parts-or-Speech (NGR-ALL) 0.635 0.528 0.576 0.612 
Tokens+POS (PAT-0P/NGR-0P) 0.756 0.839 0.796 0.784 
Lemmas+POS (NGR-ALL) 0.807 0.798 0.803 0.808 
Chunks (PAT-LA-0P) 0.658 0.589 0.622 0.640 
Dependency (PAT-LA-0P) 0.671 0.336 0.448 0.580 
Chunks+NER (NGR-ALL) 0.659 0.647 0.653 0.655 
Dependency+NER (NGR-0P) 0.551 0.617 0.582 0.559 
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5 Results and Discussion 
To obtain as objective a perspective as possible, we 
analyzed the results in two ways. First, we analyzed the 
results for each feature set separately in order to find 
out which weight calculation method and which 
pattern list modification achieved the highest results 
for each set. We looked at the highest F-score and 
Accuracy. We also checked the break-even point of 
Precision and Recall (BEP) for each version of the 
classifier. We also calculated statistical significance 
among all results within each feature set. Table 5 
presents the best results (Precision, F-score, Accuracy) 
summarized for all data sets. Detailed separate results 
for best Precision, best F-score and best Accuracy for 
each version of the classifier, along with all T-tests are 
presented in the Appendix.  
Second, we compared the results among all feature sets 
to find out whether there is a stable pattern in the 
results; e.g., if patterns are always better than n-grams, 
or if it is more effective to use all patterns, only the 
unambiguous ones, etc. Then, we analyzed whether the 
method works better on more generalized or more 
specific feature sets. Next, we calculated statistical 
significance between the best results of each feature set. 
Finally, we compared the best and the worst results of 
the proposed method to previous methods.  
5.1 Results for Each Set Separately 
5.1.1 Tokenized Data Set 
At first, we looked at the data set preprocessed with the 
simplest method—namely, tokenization. Highest 
achieved Precision was 0.861 and was obtained by 
both patterns and n-grams when zero- patterns were 
deleted from pattern lists. The second- best Precision 
was achieved by the pattern list containing all 
patterns/n-grams (0.858). However, when all 
ambiguous patterns were deleted, the highest achieved 
Precision suddenly dropped to 0.820. Awarding length 
usually caused a drop in Precision.  
The highest achieved F-score was 0.778 and was 
obtained by patterns when zero-patterns were deleted 
from pattern lists. The second-best F-score was 
achieved by the pattern list containing all patterns/n-
grams (0.724). Deleting all ambiguous patterns caused 
a drop in the F-score to 0.690. Awarding length also 
caused a drop in the F-score.  
The highest achieved Accuracy was 0.776 and was 
obtained by patterns when all ambiguous patterns were 
deleted from pattern lists. This stands in contradiction 
to the above results for best F-score, however, the 
second-best Accuracy was achieved by the pattern list 
containing all patterns/n-grams (0.766). Awarding 
length, similarly to above results, caused a drop in 
Accuracy.  
In terms of statistical significance, differences between 
most results were statistically significant, meaning 
they could not be considered a matter of chance. Pairs 
that tended to be not statistically significant included 
those that differed only in one kind of characteristics, 
e.g., PAT-0P and NGR-0P, which were also two best 
scores for highest Precision and highest F-score 
(former).  
5.1.2 Lemmatized Set 
The second simplest way of preprocessing is 
lemmatization. In this process all declined and 
conjugated words are simplified to their dictionary 
forms. Therefore, lemmatization provides less specific 
(thus less differentiated) but more frequently appearing 
features. This makes lemmatization more generalized 
than tokenization.  
The highest achieved Precision for the lemmatized 
data set was higher than for tokens and reached 0.902 
when patterns were used with length-awarded 
weighting and deleted zero-patterns. In contrast to the 
tokenized data set, where different weighting and 
pattern list modifications caused a negative influence, 
for lemmas, the influence was, in most cases, positive, 
especially in terms of awarding length in the weight 
calculation.  
The highest achieved F-score for the lemmatized data 
set was also higher than for the tokenized set and 
reached 0.79 for n-grams. The highest scores of 
pattern-based classifiers ranged lower in general. Like 
the tokenized data set, awarding length caused a drop 
in the highest achieved F-score. Also, deleting either 
zero-patterns or all ambiguous patterns/n-grams 
caused an occasional drop in scores, indicating that 
such patterns usually do not contribute positively to the 
classification based on lemmas.  
Results for the highest Accuracy within the threshold 
confirm the above results for F-score. The highest 
result was achieved by n-grams and reached 0.79. Here, 
too, the pattern list and weighting modifications 
decreased the results, in general. The differences 
among all versions of the classifier were, in most cases, 
statistically significant, usually at the 0.1% level. Like 
the tokenized data set, the results, when not significant 
usually had only one difference, e.g., PAT-0P and 
NGR-0P, or NGR-AMB and NGR-LA-AMB. 
Unfortunately, the version of the classifier which 
achieved the highest top scores—namely, NGR-ALL 
(using all n-grams in classification)—did not reach 
statistical significance with pattern-based classifiers, 
which decreased the reliability of n-gram-based scores.  
5.1.3 POS-Tagged Set 
Compared to previous data sets, POS-tagging provides 
the most generalized way of preprocessing. A small 
number of features is extracted; however, they occur 
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very frequently. Comparing the highest achieved 
scores, although the highest Precision score was 0.934 
(Recall = 0.031), all other compared measures were 
generally much lower than for the tokenized and 
lemmatized data sets, reaching 0.677 and 0.612 at best, 
for F-score and Accuracy, respectively. This data set 
also reveals the highest number of cases in which 
differences between classifier versions were not 
statistically significant. There was also no consistency 
in terms of which version of the classifier performed 
best. This could suggest that the classifier performs 
poorly for highly generalized dataset with a small 
number of unique features, even if the occurrence of 
each feature is high.  
5.1.4 Tokenized Set with POS 
Data sets containing both tokens and POS information 
provide a feature set more specific than the original 
tokenized data set. Precision scores for this data set 
were also better, reaching 0.89 when either all patterns 
or all n-grams were used. Further modifications only 
diminished the results, although for the second-best 
Precision results, the corresponding F-score and 
Accuracy scores were much higher.  
For the F-score as well as for Accuracy, the highest 
results were obtained when zero-patterns were deleted 
from the pattern list, reaching 0.796 and 0.784, 
respectively. Using all patterns, as well as deleting all 
ambiguous patterns diminished the results. Other 
modifications also failed to improve the results.  
Unfortunately, more than half the T-test results 
indicated a lack of statistical significance. For the two 
best classifier versions (PAT-0P, NGR-0P), the 
differences were generally significant only in cases 
with no weight modifications.  
5.1.5 Lemmatized Set with POS 
The data set preprocessed to contain both lemmas and 
POS information (LEM+POS) is theoretically more 
generalized then TOK+POS, but more specific than 
either for tokenized only (TOK) or lemmatized only 
(LEM) data sets. The results for previous  
preprocessing means (TOK, LEM, POS) indicated that 
lemmas alone, although being more generalized than 
tokens, were more effective. On the other hand, parts of 
speech, though providing an even higher level of 
generalization, scored much lower. By combining 
lemmas with POS and comparing the results to 
TOK+POS we can evaluate whether POS could 
contribute positively to the overall results when they are 
combined with other features, even though they impose 
a negative influence when used alone. Indeed, based on 
the TOK+POS results, we could reasonably 
hypothesize that there might be some improvement.  
The best Precision scores reached 0.956, which was the 
highest score for all previous results for any data set. 
This score was achieved by a pattern-based data set 
with all ambiguous patterns removed. However, both 
unmodified pattern- or n-gram-based classifiers also 
attained very high scores—0.954 and 0.948 
respectively.  
Results for both best F-score and best Accuracy 
revealed similar tendencies, with the n-gram-based 
unmodified classifier achieving F1=0.803 and 
A=0.808. These results confirm the positive influence 
of lemmas, as compared to simple tokens, and further 
supports the contribution of POS information, but only 
when it is also used with other features. T-test results 
for both F-score and Accuracy were, in most cases, 
either extremely statistically significant (p ≤ 0.001) or 
very statistically significant (p ≤ 0.01).  
5.1.6 Chunk-Separated Set 
While tokenization and lemmatization divide sentences 
according to words or morphemes, sentence parsing 
splits a sentence into unified meaningful chunks, 
typically consisting of more than one word. The 
simplest way of parsing is shallow parsing, or chunking, 
in which chunks are simply separated by spaces with no 
additional information provided about the relationships 
between the chunks. Chunking provides a more 
generalized preprocessing method than tokenization or 
lemmatization, but is less generalized then POS.  
The highest Precision attained was 0.875, which is 
higher than for tokens alone, but lower than for lemmas 
or POS. Results for F-score and Accuracy were much 
lower than for all other sets (F1=0.658 and A=0.640). 
Also, the differences between the classifier versions 
were rarely statistically significant. 
5.1.7 Dependency-Parsed Set 
Dependency parsing of a sentence, or deep parsing, 
refers to splitting a sentence into chunks according to 
their syntactic interrelations. It is more specific than 
chunking; however, because of the small number of 
extracted frequent features available for building a 
reliable language model, its results are often inferior to 
those derived by simple tokenization unless really large 
data sets are in use. 
The results of our experiment confirmed this. While the 
highest Precision scores reached 0.868, the best F-score 
and Accuracy scores were the worst of all data sets, 
reaching only F=0.658 and A=0.58, meaning that 
cyberbullying classification with the use of dependency 
parsing is about as accurate as random coin flipping. T-
test results were also almost never statistically 
significant.
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Table 6. Break-Even Points for all Feature Sets and All Classifier Versions. 
 TOK LEM POS 
TOK 
+POS 
LEM 
+POS 
CHUNK DEP 
CHUNK 
+NER 
DEP 
+NER 
PAT 0.761 0.751 0.613 0.785 0.781 0.633 0.566 0.603 0.510 
PAT-0P 0.763 0.751 0.613 0.786 0.781 0.632 0.551 0.605 0.512 
PAT-AMB 0.770 0.751 0.613 0.764 0.782 0.629 0.591 0.603 0.514 
PAT-LA 0.729 0.748 0.613 0.726 0.781 0.632 0.568 -- 0.505 
PAT-LA-0P 0.729 0.737 0.596 0.726 0.760 0.633 0.549 -- 0.505 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.711 0.737 0.594 0.715 0.761 0.629 0.591 -- 0.516 
NGR 0.761 0.784 0.614 0.785 0.802 0.632 0.566 0.655 0.547 
NGR-0P 0.762 0.784 0.613 0.786 0.802 0.632 0.551 0.652 0.548 
NGR-AMB 0.770 0.767 0.570 0.764 0.777 0.612 0.591 0.610 0.526 
NGR-LA 0.729 0.767 0.605 0.726 0.762 0.633 0.551 0.619 0.546 
NGR-LA-0P 0.729 0.768 0.607 0.726 0.769 0.631 0.559 0.622 0.548 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.711 0.762 0.596 0.715 0.750 0.613 0.589 0.589 0.529 
Note: Best scores for each classifier version underlined; best scores for each preprocessing method in bold font. No score 
means no BEP within the threshold range. 
 
5.1.8 Chunk-Separated Set with Named Entities 
Named entities, such as private names of people, 
companies, dates, numbers, etc., provide additional 
levels of generalization for analyzed sentences. We 
applied named-entity recognition (NER) to shallow 
and deep parsing to find out how such additional 
generalization would influence the results. The results 
were in general lower than for chunks alone, but higher 
than for dependency parsing. Much of the results were 
also statistically significant. 
5.1.9 Dependency Parsed Set with Named 
Entities 
For dependency parsing supported with named entity 
recognition, the results were in general lower than for 
chunks with NER, but higher than for dependency 
parsing alone. The differences between the results 
were also more often statistically significant. This 
suggests that named entities, even for relatively small 
data sets, contribute positively to dependency parsing-
based classification, although the contribution is still 
not strong enough to make the classification much 
better than random guessing. 
5.2 Break-Even Point Analysis 
Beyond the detailed analysis for each data set, we also 
looked at the results from a wider perspective. One of 
the popular methods of evaluation in text classification 
studies has been estimation of a break-even point 
(BEP), which is a cross-point of Precision and Recall, 
at which both of these scores (and the F-score result) 
are in equilibrium, meaning that the classifier is in its 
most balanced state. The higher the BEP, the more 
balanced the classifier. We calculated BEP for all 
versions of the proposed classifier (see Table 6 for 
results). Since versions with weight modified by 
awarding both pattern length and occurrence rarely 
obtained BEP within the threshold range, we excluded 
them from further analysis.  
For the analysis we looked at four things: (1) which 
classifier version got the highest BEP, (2) which 
classifier version usually got the highest BEP for 
different data set preprocessing, (3) which 
preprocessing usually provided highest BEP, and (4) 
what was the highest achieved BEP and which data set 
/ classifier combination produced this.  
For the classifier version most frequently achieving top 
scores, although pattern-based and n-gram-based 
classifiers often achieved similar or even the same BEP 
scores, n-grams more frequently achieved the highest 
score. Moreover, the highest score of all was also 
achieved by the n-gram-based classifier, reaching 
P=R=F1=0.802. 
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Notes: Ordered according to highest F-score from left to right with corresponding precision, recall, and accuracy. The classifier 
version that achieved the score is in parentheses. 
Figure 4. Best F-Scores for Each Dataset Preprocessing Method 
Table 7. Analysis of Influence of Data Set Generalization on Results. 
Data set 
Preprocessing 
No. of 
unique 
unigrams 
No. of 
all 
unigrams 
Feature 
Density  
Highest 
achieved 
F-score 
Highest 
unmodified 
F-score 
 
BEP  
F
ea
tu
re
 s
o
p
h
is
ti
ca
ti
o
n
 
←
lo
w
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 h
ig
h
→
 DEP 12802 13957 0.917 0.658 0.658 0.591 
DEP+NER 12160 13956 0.871 0.663 0.662 0.548 
CHUNK 11389 13960 0.816 0.658 0.658 0.633 
CHUNK+NER 10657 13872 0.768 0.686 0.684 0.655 
TOK+POS 6565 34874 0.188 0.796 0.795 0.786 
TOK 6464 36234 0.178 0.778 0.778 0.770 
LEM+POS 6227 36426 0.171 0.803 0.783 0.802 
LEM 6103 36412 0.168 0.790 0.764 0.784 
POS 13 26650 0.000 0.677 0.677 0.614 
      unique 1ngr with FD with 
      F1 F1-unmod. BEP F1 F1-unmod. BEP 
Pearson Correlation -0.450 -0.453 -0.431 -0.735* -0.736* -0.706* 
Coefficient (ρ-value) (p=0.224) (p=0.221) (p=0.247) (p=0.0242) (p=0.024) (p=0.0336) 
with statistical   F1 & BEP F1-unmod. & BEP 
significance (p-value)   0.9681*** 0.9595*** 
(*p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001) (p=0.00002) (p=0.00004) 
The data set preprocessing method that usually scored 
highest was the lemmatized data set combined with 
part-of-speech information. The highest score of all, 
mentioned above, was also achieved by this feature set.  
Also, clustering the data set preprocessing methods 
into more generalized (POS, CHUNK, DEP, 
CHUNK+NER, DEP+NER, with BEP scores below 
70%) and more specific (TOK, LEM, TOK+POS, 
LEM+POS, with BEP scores above 70%) methods, 
provides a meaningful insight. The classifier usually 
performs better on more specific feature sets. In other 
words, the method provides better results when it can 
extract large number of features, even if they occurred 
infrequently.  
Although tokens with POS were the most numerous, 
the fact that lemmas with POS achieved the highest 
result needs to be addressed. Lemmatizing a sentence 
means that declined and conjugated forms of words are 
unified. This not only makes it easier to extract 
frequent patterns, but it is also advantageous in 
classification, since a pattern consisting of dictionary 
word forms applied to test data that has also been 
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lemmatized provides much broader coverage. On the 
one hand, this offers the optimal setting for a classifier 
to use multiple specific features, but on the other hand, 
it must also be generalized to an extent so that it can 
capture a broad range of cases.  
5.3 Comparison Between Feature Sets 
Apart from analyzing BEPs, we also compared the 
highest achieved F-scores for each data set. These two 
evaluation measures rarely go together, since it would 
be difficult to have the highest F-score in place of the 
BEP. However, we can see which of the best F-scores 
is closest to the BEP. We can also follow the 
tendencies in the results (reported in Figure 4) to 
check if they correlate between the two evaluation 
measures. Lemmatization with POS information 
achieved the best score (F1=0.803 with P=0.807, 
R=0.798, and A=0.808). This confirms the winning 
setting for BEP, with a nearly identical F-score 
(0.802).  
Interestingly, while the winning setting showed high 
consistency between Precision and Recall that was 
very close to BEP, for other data set preprocessing 
settings, the F-score was lower, and the gap between 
Precision and Recall was wider. This is meaningful 
not only because the F-score, and therefore the general 
performance of the data set was lower, but also 
because it provides further insight into the influence 
of generalization on results. Here, similarly to BEPs, 
the results can be clustered into two groups: one with 
a small gap between P and R, and another with a wide 
gap. This grouping is the same for BEP analysis.  
Regarding the question of whether it is more useful to 
use pattern- or n-gram-based classifier, although the 
very best score was achieved by n-grams, both settings 
interchangeably appeared as the best settings. For 
example, the second-best setting was the pattern-
based classifier using the pattern list with zero-
patterns deleted, which achieved F1=0.796, P=0.756, 
R=0.839, and A=0.784. The third-best setting was the 
n-gram- based classifier, the fourth best was patterns 
once again, etc. This suggests that we need to perform 
more experiments, preferably using a wider threshold 
span to answer this question.  
The optimal classifier setting was the unmodified 
one—or the one with zero-patterns deleted. This 
suggests, that, although ambiguous patterns appear 
both in cyberbullying as well as in normal messages, 
it is more effective to use them in classification. This 
is an interesting insight, since in previous research it 
has often been suggested that only words/patterns that 
are specifically characteristic to cyberbullying should 
be used. For example, as discussed above, Fujii et al. 
(2010) compared “gray words/patterns” with “black 
words/patterns” that appear only in harmful messages, 
opting to disregard gray words as noise. 
5.4  Influence of Generalization on Results 
To get a better grasp on the results, we also analyzed 
how the method used to preprocess a data set 
influenced the results.  
To evaluate this we needed a quantifiable data set 
generalization measure. Broadly speaking, the more 
generalized a data set is, the fewer the number of 
frequently appearing unique features used in its 
preprocessing. Therefore, to estimate the data set 
generalization level, we decided to calculate feature 
sophistication level. We applied the lexical density 
(LD) score as the exact measure of feature 
sophistication level (Ure, 1971). LD is a score 
representing an estimated measure of content per 
lexical units for a given corpus and is calculated as the 
number of all unique words from a corpus divided by 
the number of all words in the corpus. However, 
because our research uses a variety of different 
features, not only words (tokens), and because the LD 
can vary depending on which features or feature 
combinations are used, we will henceforth call this 
measure feature-based lexical density, or Feature 
Density (FD), in short form.  
After calculating FD for all used data sets we 
calculated Pearson’s correlation coefficient (ρ-value) 
to see if there was any correlation between data set 
generalization (FD) and the results. Pearson’s 
coefficient scores range from 1.0 (meaning there is a 
perfect positive correlation) through 0.0 (no 
correlation) to -1.0 (perfect negative correlation).  
We used our highest F-scores as the results. However, 
because the highest overall F-scores were sometimes 
produced by different versions of the classifier (all 
patterns, or zero-patterns deleted; with length 
awarded, or without, etc.), we also used an unmodified 
version of the classifier (PAT-ALL). As an equivalent 
set of results, we also used BEPs. Finally, we verified 
whether the correlations were statistically significant.  
While there was no correlation between unique 
unigrams of data sets and the overall results, the 
feature density score revealed an interesting 
correlation. There was a somewhat strong negative 
correlation (approximately -0.7) between the results 
and FD. This means that the results were better when 
the feature density was low. The correlation was not 
ideal, due to the fact that the preprocessing method 
resulting in the lowest FD (POS-tagged data set) 
produced some of the worst results. Interestingly, 
preprocessing methods resulting in very high FD 
(dependency parsing, etc.) also produced similarly 
poor results. This might suggest that there could be an 
even better preprocessing method yet to be 
discovered. 
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Table 8. Results of T-test for Best F-scores for Each Data Set. 
  TOK+POS LEM TOK CHUNK+NER POS DEP+NER DEP CHUNK 
  (PAT-0P) (NGR-ALL) (PAT-0P) (NGR-ALL) (PAT-AMB) (NGR-0P) (PAT-LA-0P) (PAT-0P) 
LEM+POS 0.0005 0.0284 0.0353 0.3062 0.0028 0.0878 0.0001 0.1416 
(NGR-ALL) *** * *  **  ***  
TOK+POS  0.7225 0.091 0.0035 0.0004 0.4689 0.0001 0.0001 
(PAT-0P)    ** ***  *** *** 
LEM   0.0214 0.0102 0.0031 0.5168 0.0001 0.0018 
(NGR-ALL)   * * *  *** ** 
TOK    0.0576 0.0027 0.2423 0.0001 0.0018 
(PAT-0P)     **  *** ** 
CHUNK+NER     0.003 0.0329 0.0001 0.0004 
(NGR-ALL)     ** * *** *** 
POS      0.002 0.0213 0.0091 
(PAT-AMB)      ** * ** 
DEP+NER       0.0001 0.0013 
(NGR-0P)       *** ** 
DEP        0.0001 
(PAT-LA-0P)               *** 
For the given data sets, the scores increase in tandem 
with decreasing FD, until the lowest FD is reached, 
which also resulted in low scores. Therefore, in the 
future we plan to use the FD measure to find a 
preprocessing method with optimal feature density, 
resulting in even better results. We present the analysis 
of the influence of data set generalization on the results 
in Table 7. 
5.5  Statistical Significance of Results 
As a final step in the analysis of the results for our 
proposed method, we analyzed the statistical 
significance of the highest F-scores for each data set 
preprocessing method. As a measure of significance, 
we used the Student’s paired T-test, since the results 
represented either one of two sides 
(cyberbullying/harmful or nonharmful), and we 
compared all pairs of optimized methods (that 
produced the highest F-scores for the certain data set). 
Results of the T-test for the best F-scores for each data 
set are reported in Table 8.  
We were most interested in how the best method 
(LEM+POS/NGR-ALL) compared to other methods, 
especially the worst methods. The worst methods 
(based on chunking, dependency parsing, and POS 
alone), always differed significantly with better 
methods (based on tokens, lemmas, and those 
combined with POS). Usually, the difference was very 
significant (p ≤ 0.01) or even extremely significant (p 
≤ 0.001). There were some cases, however, in which 
the difference did not reach significance levels (e.g., 
CHUNK/PAT-0P vs. LEM+POS/NGR-ALL), 
indicating that we need to perform further experiments 
or widen the threshold span to obtain more result 
samples for comparison. 
5.6 Comparison with Previous Methods 
After specifying optimal settings for the proposed 
method, we compared it to previous methods. In the 
comparison, we used the methods proposed by 
Matsuba et al. (2011), Nitta et al. (2013), and, most 
recently, Ptaszynski et al. (2016). Moreover, since the 
Nitta et al.’s method extracts cyberbullying relevance 
values from the web (in particular Yahoo! API), 
beyond comparison to the reported results, we also 
repeated Nitta et al.’s experiment to find out how the 
performance of the web-based method has changed 
over the years. Finally, to make the comparison fairer, 
we compared both our best and worst results. For the 
evaluation metrics, we used the same one used in 
previous research—namely, area under the curve 
(AUC) on the graph in Figure 5 (which presents all 
results) showing Precision and Recall combined.  
The highest overall results in terms of AUC were 
obtained by the best settings of the proposed method 
(based on all n-grams and normalized feature weight). 
Although the method starts low, it quickly attains over 
95% of Precision and maintains this score even in the 
context of around 60% Recall. 
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Figure 5. Comparison Between the Proposed Method (Best and Worst Performance) and Previous Methods. 
Furthermore, even when the method loses Precision, the 
loss is not sudden or steep, but decreases slowly, 
maintaining high Precision values at around 70%, even 
when Recall reaches 90%. This method also 
outperformed all previous methods.  
The second-best method (tokens with POS, all patterns, 
no weight modification) begins with a high Precision of 
77% and retains it between 80% and 90% for most of the 
threshold. Although the highest originally reported 
Precision score by Nitta et al. (2013) was better than our 
second-best score, the performance of their method 
quickly decreased due to a quick drop in Precision for 
higher thresholds. Even our worst proposed method 
(based on separation by chunks with zero-patterns 
deleted) was still better than all other previous research, 
except for the original studies reported in 2013 and 
improved in 2016. Moreover, when we repeated Nitta et 
al.’s (2013) experiment in early 2015, the results 
declined greatly, losing over 30 percentage points of 
Precision. After a thorough analysis of the experiment 
data, we noticed that most of the information extracted in 
2013 was not available in 2015. This could be due to the 
following reasons. First, fluctuation in page rankings of 
the applied search engine (Yahoo!) could have pushed 
the information further in the list making it inaccessible 
using Nitta et al.’s method. Second, frequent deletion 
requests of harmful contents by net-patrol members 
could potentially have had an effect. Third, recently, 
most web service providers have begun to tighten their 
usage policies. This applies to all major companies, 
including Google, Twitter, and Yahoo!, used by Nitta et 
al. (2013), and also applies to the recently introduced 
DMARC policies related to email spoofing and to 
general improvements in policies aimed at decreasing 
Internet harassment (http://www.dmarc.org). Such 
changes seeking to limit the growing problem of Internet 
harassment, implemented on a corporate level, are, in 
general, a positive phenomenon, despite reducing the 
performance of cyberbullying detection software. 
Moreover, as was recently shown by Ptaszynski et al. 
(2016), the performance of such software can, to some 
extent, be improved by automatically optimizing the list 
of seed words applied during use.  
However, the fact that the performance of Nitta et al.’s 
method decreased from over 90% of Precision to less 
than 60% over three years is an important warning for 
other research based on web search-engine results. The 
probability of such problems was highlighted over a 
decade ago (Kilgarriff, 2007) and are likely to become a 
major problem in the future. This also suggests the need 
for more focus on corpus-based methods such as the one 
proposed here.  
Finally, while our numerical results favored the proposed 
approach, we also wanted to understand the extent to 
which the patterns automatically recognized by the 
proposed method cover the manually selected seed 
words employed in previous research (Matsuba et al., 
2010; Matsuba et al., 2011; Nitta et al., 2013). We found 
that all original seed words used in previous methods did, 
in fact, appear in the list of patterns automatically 
extracted by our proposed method. This can be 
interpreted as follows. First, the definition of 
cyberbullying (MEXT, 2008) and the intuition of 
researchers, which served as a primary basis for most 
previous approaches, were generally correct. Second, 
using our automatically extracted patterns, it may be 
possible to improve previous approaches in the future.  
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Finally, we also performed additional experiments using 
traditional classifiers applied in all previous research on 
automatic cyberbullying detection—namely, SVM, 
Naive Bayes, JRip, J48 and kNN, which we applied in 
experiments with the 10-fold cross-validation condition. 
All these classifiers consistently produced results that 
were inferior to the proposed method, optimized for each 
data set. Therefore, for each data set the winning 
classifier was always our proposed method.  
The single case, in which a traditional classifier 
performed better than the proposed method, was the 
lemmatized data set classified with linear SVM on a bag-
of-words with tf*idf weighting. However, since this 
classifier setting did not confirm its advantage over the 
proposed method for any other data set, it cannot be 
stated with any confidence that this is the optimal 
classification setting. The difference between the 
proposed best method and SVM-linear, when compared 
for all data sets, was statistically significant (p=0.0168, 
paired T-test). However, when the only one winning case 
for SVM was excluded, the significance was much 
higher (p=0.0044). This suggests the following 
interpretation. For all data sets, where the proposed 
method achieved higher results as compared to SVM-
linear, the differences were very significant. The only 
case in which SVMs were superior, decreased the 
significance. Although we cannot discard this SVM 
classifier setting, due to its legitimately better results, in 
the future we will need to perform additional 
experiments in order to determine the definitive superior 
method.  
As an additional remark, for traditional classifiers the 
tendencies in our results generally confirmed those 
produced by the proposed method. The results were 
better for tokenized and lemmatized data sets, with or 
without parts-of-speech, and much worse for POS-only, 
chunks, and dependency-parsed data sets. We present all 
results of experiments on traditional classifiers in Table 
9. 
Table 9. All Results of Experiments on Traditional Classifiers on All Data Sets. 
  LEM 
+POS 
TOK 
+POS 
LEM TOK 
CHUNK 
+NER 
POS 
DEP 
+NER 
DEP CHUNK 
SVM 
li
n
ea
r 
Prec .777 .768 .827 .777 .679 .563 .651 .639 .606 
Rec .777 .766 .825 .776 .645 .563 .615 .577 .603 
F1 .776 .766 .825 .775 .623 .563 .586 .531 .597 
Acc .777 .766 .825 .776 .645 .563 .615 .577 .603 
p
ly
n
o
m
ia
l Prec .262 .499 .262 .263 .260 .553 .260 .260 .260 
Rec .512 .499 .512 .513 .510 .545 .510 .510 .510 
F1 .346 .450 .347 .348 .344 .528 .344 .344 .344 
Acc .512 .499 .512 .513 .510 .545 .510 .510 .510 
r
a
d
ia
l 
Prec .797 .753 .262 .793 .260 .565 .260 .260 .260 
Rec .771 .747 .512 .756 .510 .565 .510 .510 .510 
F1 .765 .746 .347 .746 .344 .565 .344 .344 .344 
Acc .771 .747 .512 .756 .510 .565 .510 .510 .510 
si
g
m
o
id
 Prec .757 .746 .262 .752 .260 .562 .260 .260 .260 
Rec .549 .736 .512 .538 .510 .562 .510 .510 .510 
F1 .425 .733 .347 .403 .344 .561 .344 .344 .344 
Acc .549 .736 .512 .538 .510 .562 .510 .510 .510 
Naive 
Bayes 
Prec .678 .671 .686 .682 .666 .570 .652 .672 .685 
Rec .674 .669 .682 .678 .627 .569 .578 .555 .598 
F1 .673 .668 .681 .677 .599 .568 .511 .453 .539 
Acc .674 .669 .682 .678 .627 .569 .578 .555 .598 
JRip 
Prec .606 .614 .604 .603 .628 .553 .643 .505 .685 
Rec .606 .613 .603 .603 .555 .553 .533 .510 .598 
F1 .606 .613 .603 .603 .469 .553 .408 .345 .539 
Acc .606 .613 .603 .603 .555 .553 .533 .510 .598 
J48 
Prec .672 .671 .683 .675 .615 .566 .652 .260 .645 
Rec .671 .666 .681 .672 .548 .566 .533 .510 .517 
F1 .670 .663 .680 .669 .458 .566 .408 .344 .365 
Acc .671 .666 .681 .672 .548 .566 .533 .510 .517 
kNN (k=1) 
Prec .639 .630 .644 .630 .578 .544 .593 .628 .576 
Rec .636 .627 .640 .628 .546 .543 .529 .528 .550 
F1 .633 .625 .637 .626 .505 .542 .446 .427 .494 
Acc .636 .627 .640 .628 .546 .543 .529 .528 .550 
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Figure 6. Activity Diagram of the Application. 
 
Figure 7. Interface of the Developed Application with Numbers (in Red) Marking Each Element of 
the Interface. 
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6  Cyberbullying Blocker Test 
Application for Android Devices 
In this section, we present the mobile device 
application we developed to implement the proposed 
cyberbullying detection method. This application was 
created for devices supporting Android 4.2.2 (API 
level 17—i.e., “Jelly Bean”) or higher. In this process, 
Java 8 and Android Studio were used. The application 
contains one activity responsible for interaction with 
the user. For the process of checking the text for 
possible harmful content, it starts a background 
thread. Therefore, the user still can use the device 
even if the checking process takes a while. For 
comparison, beyond the cyberbullying detection 
method proposed in this paper, we also implemented 
Nitta et al.’s method (2013). We did this to test how 
the method proposed here would perform when 
compared to other methods. In the test phase, the user 
could use both methods to compare their overall 
performance, referring not only to Precision and 
Recall of detection, discussed in Section 4.5, but also 
to processing time and other features which could be 
used for further improvement of the proposed method.  
Figure 6 represents an activity diagram of the 
detection process. Depending on the method of 
detection, the application may require an Internet 
connection. The application allows new methods for 
cyberbullying detection to be added or removed 
without affecting the operation of the application 
itself. 
6.1 Description of Application Interface 
The application interface is designed in accordance 
with the standards for the Android operating system17 
Interaction with a user is intuitive and essential 
information is accessible in the main window. Figure 
7 represents the interface with a description of each 
important element. Below we describe the interface 
of the application. The numbers correspond to the 
numbers in red in Figure 7. 
1. Name of the application 
2. Settings, information about the application, and 
short descriptions of the methods used for 
cyberbullying detection 
3. Input for text to classify 
4. Choice of the method for cyberbullying 
classification 
 
17 http://developer.android.com/  
5. Button “check”: clicking on it starts the process 
of checking the entered text 
6. Button “clear”: clears the input and feedback 
fields 
7. Field showing the feedback of the method used 
for analyzing the text 
6.2 Harmful Content Detection Process 
Below we describe the process of detecting possible 
harmful content within the application. 
1. Sentence input. First, the user inputs text to 
check. There is no limit on how long it can be, 
and the user can input several sentences at the 
same time. However, large inputs will slow the 
detection process for both methods. The only 
limitation is the phone memory for the 
TextView control class, which is usually set to 
9,000 characters. Due to limitations of 
smartphone screen size, the application allows 
a maximum of five visible lines of input; to see 
additional lines the user must scroll down. The 
user can input any content desired, and the 
system will detect words and patterns 
recognizable by the used algorithm. 
2. Selection of detection method. A user should 
choose one method from a list of all algorithms. 
Short description of methods can be found in 
the Settings tab of the application. The option 
of choosing the method is only available in the 
initial test version of the application and is 
intended to assist users in selecting the best 
algorithm for mobile devices. 
3. Launch of the checking process. 
4. Feedback. Processing the input text results in 
the selected method either detecting harmful 
patterns or not. In the first case, the feedback 
informs the user that no harmful words or 
patterns were detected in the input. The 
feedback also contains information about 
which classification method was used and the 
text entered by the user (see right part of Figure 
8). In the second case, the feedback reports that 
the input sentence contained harmful content, 
identifies which method was used in detection, 
and shows the entered text and the detected 
harmful patterns in red bold font (see center 
section of Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Text Input and Choice of Processing Method (Left), Harmful Text Output (Center), 
Nonharmful Text Output (Right). 
6.3 Methods Description 
For test purposes in the developed application, we plan 
to apply a number of different classification methods. 
In the first version of the application, described here, 
for the purpose of detection of harmful content in text 
on mobile devices, we used two previously developed 
methods of detection, both of which have been adapted 
to the Java language and Android environment. The 
methods can be replaced and updated in the future and 
we also plan on adding other methods. 
6.3.1 Method A 
As the first method (“Method A”) we used the method 
presented in this paper, which classifies messages as 
harmful or not by using a classifier trained with a 
language modeling method based on a brute-force 
search algorithm applied to language modeling. 
Therefore, the efficiency of this method is essentially 
associated with the computing power of the device that 
is currently running the application. As all patterns 
used in classification are stored on the mobile device, 
the method can operate locally, and does not require an 
Internet connection. 
6.3.2 Method B 
The second method, further called (“Method B”) uses 
a list of seed words from three categories to calculate 
the semantic orientation score SO-PMI-IR and then 
maximizes the relevance of categories using an input 
sentence according to a method developed by Nitta et 
al. (2013). The three steps in the classification of the 
harmfulness of input are: 
1. Phrase extraction, 
2. Categorization and harmful word detection 
together with harmfulness polarity determination, 
3. Relevance maximization. 
This method is an extension of the method proposed 
by Turney (2002) to calculate the relevance of words 
with specified categories according to the Equation 8, 
where pi is a phrase extracted from the input, wj are the 
words that are registered in one category of 
harmfulness polarity words, hits(pi) and hits(wj) are 
web search hits for each category for pi and wj 
respectively, hits(pi&wj) is a number of hits when pi 
and wj appear on the same web page. Finally, PMI–
IR(pi,wj) is the relevance of pi and wj . 
( 8 ) 
PMI − IR(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑤𝑗) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 {
ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠(𝑝𝑖&𝑤𝑗)
ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠(𝑝𝑖)ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠(𝑤𝑗)
} 
Turney’s method was extended to work not only on 
words, but also on phrases. The phrases are 
automatically extracted from input sentences using 
dependency relations. Next, for all phrases, the 
relevance is calculated with seed words from multiple 
categories of harmful words. The degree of association 
for each category, the PMI-IR score, is maximized so 
that the maximum value achieved within all categories 
is considered as the harmfulness score representative 
for the input sentence and is calculated according to the 
Equation 9. 
( 9 ) 
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 =   
= 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑒(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦(𝑃𝑀𝐼 − 𝐼𝑅(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑤𝑗))) 
This method does not require excessive computer 
power and works on a small list of seed words, which 
can be further refined and optimized as shown by 
Ptaszynski et al. (2016). However, this method does 
require a stable Internet connection for calculating the 
PMI-IR score of the phrases with each group of seed 
words. 
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Table 10. Comparison of Different Features for Two Methods. 
 Method A  Method B 
Avg. # of words / patterns 11,832,430 9 
used in classification   
Internet connection required NO YES 
Avg. time for one sentence 88.46 s 8.41 s 
(in seconds and minutes) (1.47 m) (0.14 m) 
6.4 Preliminary Tests 
We performed preliminary tests with the developed 
applications. The tests were not meant to check the 
validity of the applied methods, as this was already 
confirmed in previous papers (Nitta et al. 2013, 
Ptaszynski et al. 2016) and reconfirmed in this paper. 
We verified only whether the applied classification 
methods performed correctly under the new 
environment and whether they returned proper 
feedback.  
For the purpose of testing the application, we prepared 
a set of sentences, derived from a data set used in 
previous research. Some of these sentences contained 
harmful words and some did not. We entered the 
sentences individually into the application input field 
and tested both methods. We present examples of 
outputs for harmful and nonharmful sentences in the 
center and right sections of Fig. 8, respectively. As our 
final goal, we plan to release the application for 
multiple languages. However, currently, since both of 
the applied cyberbullying detection methods only work 
using the Japanese language, the application was also 
developed for this language. However, for the 
purposes of this paper, we present the application 
interface and the sentence examples in English 
translation.  
We performed tests on virtual devices emulated by 
Genymotion engine (Sony Xperia with Android 4.2.2 
and Google Nexus 10 with Android 5.0) and on 
Smartphone LG G2 with Android 5.0.2. The tests 
focused on the performance of algorithms used on 
mobile devices, rather than on the usability of the 
application, because the current version of the 
application was created purely to verify if the detection 
algorithms work correctly on mobile devices and to 
evaluate which of them would be best for use in the full 
version of the application. Depending on the 
classification method, the detected harmful words may 
differ. Moreover, the processing speed of detection is 
associated with the type of device used (virtual 
smartphone, budget smartphone, or high-end 
smartphone) and the length of the text.  
There was no clear winner. Method A achieves much 
better results and could be advantageous due to its lack 
of need for Internet connection. However, because it 
uses massive numbers of patterns, it takes about ten 
times longer to process one sentence than does Method 
B. On the other hand, while Method B works more 
quickly, it needs an Internet connection and the results 
are not as accurate. However, if the Method B could be 
improved so that it is as effective as Method A, it could 
be the better option, since access to Internet connection 
is an increasingly minor impediment. Results of the 
experiments are summarized in Table 10.  
However, since Method A—the proposed method in 
this paper—produces far superior results, we believe 
that improving its processing speed, making it practical 
to implement on mobile devices, would be the best 
path forward. We have considered several ways to 
further this goal in the near future.  
• Distributed computing. Since Method A 
classifies a massive number of sentence 
patterns, the processing is very time consuming. 
The processing time could be greatly reduced 
by distributing the pattern matching procedure 
on multiple CPU cores. Since modern mobile 
devices already use a multicore architecture, it 
may be possible to utilize it to improve the 
overall processing speed of running the method 
on such a device.  
• Feature filtering. Another way to reduce 
processing time could involve filtering less 
useful patterns. Our experiments have already 
shown that in some situations deleting 
ambiguous patterns improved performance (F-
score). This means that in such situations, not 
only is pattern matching performance 
improved, but also processing time, since 
deleting some patterns, in practice, equates to 
less time spent on processing individual 
sentences. Moreover, more sophisticated 
pattern filtering methods could be used. For 
example, increasingly popular deep learning 
methods also perform feature filtering in 
practice. Such methods do not scale well when 
a massive number of features is applied during 
the initial phase. However, this problem exists 
only during the training phase, which could be 
done on a powerful server. The final product 
would then contain only the patterns/features 
selected by the neural network during the 
training phase.  
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• Applying more effective classifiers. Along 
with feature filtering, it may be possible to 
apply a more time-efficient classifier. Since 
classifiers like SVMs, which also achieved 
comparatively good results in the experiments, 
are known for their fast processing time, it may 
be possible to apply them as the classifier in the 
proposed method.  
• Cloud API. Finally, it may be possible to 
implement the method remotely, with a Cloud 
API. As such, the final product would only 
contain an I/O interface for the text message to 
process, while the processing itself would take 
place on a powerful remote server. While a 
constant Internet connection would be needed, 
this solution would completely remove the 
problem of insufficient hardware on the user 
side. 
7 Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper, we proposed a method for automatic 
detection of Internet forum entries that contain 
cyberbullying messages; i.e., Internet content intended 
to humiliate and/or slander other people. 
Cyberbullying is an increasingly problematic social 
problem that negatively impacts the mental health of 
Internet users and has been implicated in self-harm and 
even suicide incidents among victims of cyberbullying.  
The proposed method of counteracting cyberbullying 
applies a combinatorial algorithm, resembling a brute-
force search algorithm, to automatically extract 
sophisticated sentence patterns, and uses those patterns 
for the text classification of cyberbullying entries. We 
tested this method on actual cyberbullying data 
obtained from the Human Rights Center, and 
performed experiments on nine different feature sets. 
The settings that were revealed as optimal consisted of 
word lemmas with part-of-speech information. Our 
results demonstrate that the proposed method 
outperformed all previously investigated methods. 
Moreover, when experiments from previous research 
were repeated, we found out that even the worst 
version of our proposed method outperformed 
previous methods, which declined in effectivity, in part, 
because they were primarily dependent on information 
extracted from the Internet. Apart from achieving 
superior performance, the proposed method is also 
more efficient than previous methods, as it requires 
minimal human effort.  
We also presented an Android application for the 
detection of entries that contain cyberbullying. For the 
application, beyond the method proposed in this paper, 
we applied another method for comparison of features 
and performance. The main difference between the two 
detection methods from the point of view of software 
engineering, was that Method B (based on Nitta et al., 
(2013) required access to the Internet, while retaining 
low computing-power needs. Method A (proposed 
here), on the other hand, does not require Internet 
connection, but needs sufficient computing power. 
Since the future use of this application is inextricably 
linked with communication via the Internet, and each 
new generation of smartphones represents a major 
technological leap, we believe that these drawbacks 
will be quickly overcome by technological advances.  
We outline two paths for further development. First, to 
improve the detection method itself, we plan to apply 
different means of data set preprocessing to find out 
whether performance can be further improved and to 
what extent. We found that too few highly generalized 
features (such as parts of speech alone) resulting in 
very low feature density, as well as too many overly 
specific features (sentence chunks with dependency 
relations) resulting in very high feature density, cause 
similarly poor results. In contrast, feature sets that are, 
to some extent, generalized but also plentiful (lemmas 
with POS), resulting in not-too-high and not-too-low 
feature density, produce the highest scores. We will 
pursue this path to discover the optimal feature density 
for the applied data set, and for the proposed method 
in general. We also plan to obtain new data to evaluate 
the method more thoroughly and plan to apply 
different classifiers. Finally, we plan to verify the 
actual amount of cyberbullying information on the 
Internet and reevaluate the method in more realistic 
conditions.  
The second path for further development involves 
three main goals for the improvement of the developed 
smartphone application. First, we plan to evaluate how 
the performance of detection of the harmful words can 
be improved by using other methods or by optimizing 
the existing ones; in particular, for mobile devices. 
Second, we plan to identify the best way to implement 
our software on Internet communication applications 
such as Facebook or Twitter while conforming to all 
safety and privacy policies. At this point, we plan to 
either develop a plugin for existing applications or 
create a virtual keyboard for mobile devices. Finally, 
we plan to expand the scope of potential users by 
creating a version of the application for other dominant 
mobile systems (e.g., iOS).
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
1105 
References 
Aramaki, E., Maskawa, S., & Morita, M. (2011). 
Twitter catches the flu: Detecting influenza 
epidemics using Twitter. Proceedings of the 
Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural 
Language Processing (pp. 1568-1576).  
Beijer, F. (2002). The syntax and pragmatics of 
exclamations and other expressive/emotional 
utterances (Working Papers in Linguistics 2, 
Lund University, Dept. of English). Retrieved 
from citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download; 
jsessionid=255023532D85248C47ACE0F814
FC7C45?doi=10.1.1.13.5737&rep=rep1&type
=pdf 
Buntin, M. B., Burke, M. F., Hoaglin, M. C., & 
Blumenthal, D. (2011). The benefits of health 
information technology: A review of the recent 
literature shows predominantly positive results. 
Health affairs, 30(3), 464-471.  
Cambria, E. & Hussain, A. (2012). Sentic Computing: 
Techniques, Tools, and Applications. Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Springer.  
Cano, A. E., He, Y., Liu K. & Zhao J. (2013). A weakly 
supervised Bayesian model for violence 
detection in social media. Proceedings of the 
6th International Joint Conference on Natural 
Language Processing.  
Cross, D., Shaw, T., Hearn, L., Epstein, M., Monks, H., 
Lester, L., & Thomas, L. (2009). Australian 
covert bullying prevalence study. Retrieved 
from https://docs.education.gov.au/collections 
/australian-covert-bullying-prevalence-study.  
Damashek, M. (1995). Gauging similarity with n-
grams: Language independent categorization of 
text. Science, 267(5199), 843.  
Dinakar, K., Jones, B., Havasi, C., Lieberman, H., & 
Picard, R. (2012). Commonsense reasoning for 
detection, prevention and mitigation of 
cyberbullying, ACM Transactions on 
Intelligent Interactive Systems, 2(3), Article 18. 
Dooley J. J., Pyżalski J., & Cross D. (2009). 
Cyberbullying versus face-to- face bullying: A 
theoretical and conceptual review, Zeitschrift 
für Psychologie / Journal of Psychology, 217(4), 
182-188.  
Fujii, Y., Ando, S., & Ito, T. (2010). Yūgai jōhō 
firutaringu no tame no 2-tango-kan no kyori 
oyobi kyōki jōhō ni yoru bunshō bunrui shuhō 
no teian [Developing a method based on 2-
word co-occurrence information for filtering 
harmful information] (in Japanese), 
Proceedings of The 24th Annual Conference of 
The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence  
(pp. 1-4).  
Gregor, S., & Hevner, A. (2013). Positioning and 
presenting design science research for 
maximum impact. MIS Quarterly, 37(2), 337-
355.  
Guthrie, D., Allison, B., Liu, W., Guthrie, L., & Wilks, 
Y. (2006). A closer look at skip-gram 
modelling. Proceedings of the 5th international 
Conference on Language Resources and 
Evaluation (pp. 1-4).  
Harris, Z. 1954. Distributional structure. Word, 10 
(2/3), pp. 146-162.  
Hasebrink, U., Görzig, A., Haddon, L., Kalmus, V., & 
Livingstone, S. (2011). Patterns of risk and 
safety online: In-depth analyses from the EU 
Kids Online survey of 9-to 16-year-olds and 
their parents in 25 European countries. London: 
EU Kids Online Network.  
Hasebrink, U., Livingstone, S., Haddon, L., & O’ 
lafsson, K. (2009). Comparing children’s 
online opportunities and risks across Europe: 
Cross-national comparisons for EU Kids 
Online. London: EU Kids Online  
Hashimoto, H., Kinoshita, T., & Harada, M. (2010). 
Firutaringu no tame no ingo no yūgai goi 
kenshutsu kinō no imi kaiseki shisutemu SAGE 
e no kumikomi [Implementing a function for 
filtering harmful slang words into the semantic 
analysis system SAGE] (in Japanese), IPSJ SIG 
Notes, 81(14), pp. 1-6.  
Hevner, A., March, S., Park, J., & Ram, S. (2004). 
Design science in information systems research. 
MIS Quarterly, 28(1), pp. 75-105.  
Hinduja, S., & Patchin, J. W. (2009). Bullying beyond 
the schoolyard: Preventing and responding to 
cyberbullying. Newbury Park, CA: Corwin.  
Huang, X., Alleva, F., Hon, H.-W., Hwang, & M.-Y., 
Rosenfeld, R. (1992). The SPHINX-II speech 
recognition system: An overview, Computer, 
Speech and Language, 7, pp. 137–148.  
Ikeda, K., Yanagihara, T., Matsumoto, K., & 
Takishima, Y. (2010). Kakuyōso no chūshōka 
ni motozuku ihō-, yūgai-bunsho kenshutsu 
shuhō no teian to hyōka [Proposal and 
evaluation of a method for illegal and harmful 
document detection based on the abstraction of 
case elements] (in Japanese), Proceedings of 
72nd National Convention of Information 
Processing Society of Japan (pp.71-72).  
Ishisaka, T., & Yamamoto, K. (2010). 2channeru wo 
taishō to shita waruguchi hyōgen no chūshutsu 
[Extraction of abusive expressions from 
Sentence Pattern Extortion for Cyberbullying Detection  
 
 
1106 
2channel] (in Japanese). Proceedings of The 
Sixteenth Annual Meeting of The Association 
for Natural Language Processing (pp.178-181).  
Kann, L., Kinchen, S. Shanklin, S. L., Flint, K. H., 
Hawkins, J., Harris, … Zaza, S. (2013). Youth 
risk behavior surveillance: United states. 
morbidity and mortality weekly report. Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 63(4), 66.  
Kilgarriff, A. (2007). Googleology is bad science. 
Computational linguistics, 33(1), 147-151.  
Kitajima, S., Rzepka, R., & Araki, K. (2014). Blog 
snippets based drug effects extraction system 
using lexical and grammatical restrictions. 
International Journal of Multimedia Data 
Engineering and Management, 5(2), 1-17.  
Kontostathis, A., Reynolds, K., Garron, A., & Edwards, 
L. (2013). Detecting cyberbullying: Query 
terms and techniques. Proceedings of the 5th 
ACM Web Science Conference (195-204).  
Kowalski, R. M., & Limber, S. P. (2007). Electronic 
bullying among middle school students. 
Journal of Adolescent Health, 41(6), S22–S30.  
Krippendorff, K. (1986). Combinatorial Explosion. 
Web Dictionary of Cybernetics and Systems. 
Retrieved from http://pespmc1.vub. 
ac.be/ASC/COMBIN_EXPLO.html  
Lazuras L., Pyżalski J., Barkoukis V., & Tsorbazoudis 
H. (2012). Empathy and moral disengagement 
in adolescent cyberbullying: Implications for 
educational intervention and pedagogical 
Practice, Studia Edukacyjne, 23, 57-69.  
Leets, L. (2001). Responses to Internet hate sites: Is 
speech too free in cyberspace? Communication 
Law and Policy, 6(2),  287-317.  
Lau, R. Y., Liao, S. Y., Kwok, R. C. W., Xu, K., Xia, 
Y., & Li, Y. (2012). Text mining and 
probabilistic language modeling for online 
review spam detection. ACM Transactions on. 
Management Information Systems, 2(4), Article 
25.  
Li, Q. (2007). Bullying in the new playground: 
Research into cyberbullying and cyber 
victimisation. Australasian Journal of 
Education Technology, 23(4), 435-454.  
Marathe, S. S., & Shirsat, K. P. (2015). Contextual 
features based naïve Bayes classifier for 
cyberbullying detection on YouTube. 
International Journal of Scientific and 
Engineering Research, 6(11), 1109-1114.  
Markov, A. A. (1971). Extension of the limit theorems 
of probability theory to a sum of variables 
connected in a chain. Reprinted in Appendix B 
of R. Howard. Dynamic Probabilistic Systems 
(Vol. 1: Markov Chains). New York, NY: 
Wiley.  
Masui, F., Ptaszynski, M., & Nitta, T. (2013). 
Intānetto-jō no yūgai kakikomi kenshutsu sōchi 
oyobi kenshutsu hōhō [Device and method for 
detection of harmful entries on the Internet] (In 
Japanese). Patent application number 2013-
245813.  
Matsuba, T., Masui, F., Kawai, A., & Isu, N. (2010). 
Gakkou hikoushiki saito ni okeru yuugai jouhou 
kenshutsu [Detection of harmful information on 
informal school websites] (In Japanese). 
Proceedings of the 16th Annual Meeting of The 
Association for Natural Language Processing.  
Matsuba, T., Masui, F., Kawai, A., & Isu, N. (2011). 
Gakkō hi-kōshiki saito ni okeru yūgai jōhō 
kenshutsu wo mokuteki to shita kyokusei hantei 
moderu ni kansuru kenkyū [A study on the 
polarity classification model for the purpose of 
detecting harmful information on informal 
school sites] (in Japanese). Proceedings of The 
Seventeenth Annual Meeting of The Association 
for Natural Language Processing (pp. 388-
391).  
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (MEXT). (2008). ‘Netto-jō no 
ijime’ ni kansuru taiō manyuaru jirei shū 
(gakkō, kyōin muke) [“Bullying on the Net” 
Manual for handling and collection of cases (for 
schools and teachers)] (in Japanese). Retrieved 
from http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou 
/20/11/08111701/001.pdf  
Nitta, T., Masui, F. Ptaszynski, M. Kimura, Y., Rzepka, 
R., & Araki, K.. (2013). Detecting 
cyberbullying entries on informal school 
websites based on category relevance 
maximization. Proceedings of the 6th 
International Joint Conference on Natural 
Language Processing (pp. 579-586).  
Patchin, J. W., & Hinduja, S. (2006). Bullies move 
beyond the schoolyard: A preliminary look at 
cyberbullying. Youth Violence and Juvenile 
Justice, 4(2), 148-169.  
Ponte, J. M., & Croft, W. B. (2017). A language 
modeling approach to information retrieval. In 
ACM SIGIR Forum, 51(2), 202-208.    
Potts, C., & Schwarz, F. (2008). Exclamatives and 
heightened emotion: Extracting pragmatic 
generalizations from large corpora 
(Unpublished manuscript). University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts, USA.  
Ptaszynski, M., Dybala, P., Matsuba, T., Masui, F., 
Rzepka, R., Araki, K., & Momouchi, Y. (2010). 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
1107 
In the service of online order: Tackling cyber-
bullying with machine learning and affect 
analysis. International Journal of 
Computational Linguistics Research, 1(3), 135-
154. 
Ptaszynski, M., Rzepka, R., Araki, K., & Momouchi, 
Y. (2011). Language combinatorics: A sentence 
pattern extraction architecture based on 
combinatorial explosion. International Journal 
of Computational Linguistics, 2(1), 24-36.  
Ptaszynski, M., Masui, F., Nitta, T., Hatakeyama, S., 
Kimura, Y., Rzepka, R., & Araki, K. (2016). 
Sustainable cyberbullying detection with 
category-maximized relevance of harmful 
phrases and double-filtered automatic 
optimization. International Journal of Child- 
Computer Interaction, 8, 15-30.  
Pyżalski, J. (2012). From cyberbullying to electronic 
aggression: typology of the phenomenon, 
Emotional and Behavioural Difficulties, 17, 
305-317  
Sahlgren, M., & Cöster, R. (2004, August). Using bag-
of-concepts to improve the performance of 
support vector machines in text categorization. 
Proceedings of the 20th International 
Conference on Computational Linguistics (p. 
487).  
Sarna, G., & Bhatia, M. P. S. (2017). Content based 
approach to find the credibility of user in social 
networks: an application of cyberbullying. 
International Journal of Machine Learning and 
Cybernetics, 8(2), 677-689.   
Sasai, K. (2006). The structure of modern Japanese 
exclamatory sentences: On the structure of the 
Nanto-type sentence. Studies in the Japanese 
Language, 2(1), 16-31.  
Siu, M., & Ostendorf, M. (2000). Variable n-grams and 
extensions for conversational speech language 
modeling. IEEE Transactions on Speech and 
Audio Processing, 8(1), 63-75.  
Smith, B., Ceusters, W., Klagges, B., Köhler, J., 
Kumar, A., Lomax, J., M., … Rosse, C., (2005). 
Relations in biomedical ontologies. Genome 
biology, 6(5), R46.  
Song, D., Huang, Q., Bruza, P., & Lau, R. (2012), An 
aspect query language model based on query 
decomposition and high-order contextual term 
associations. Computational Intelligence, 28, 1-
23.  
Sood, S. O., Churchill, E. F., & Antin, J. (2012). 
Automatic identification of personal insults on 
social news sites. Journal of the American 
Society for Information Science and 
Technology, 63(2), 270-285.  
Sourander, A., Klomek, A. B., Ikonen, M., Lindroos, 
J., Luntamo, T., Koskelainen, M., ...  Helenius, 
H. (2010). Psychosocial risk factors associated 
with cyberbullying among adolescents: A 
population-based study. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 67(7), 720-728.  
Turney, P. D. (2002). Thumbs up or thumbs down? 
Semantic orientation applied to unsupervised 
classification of reviews. Proceedimgs of the 
40th Annual Meeting of the Association for 
Computational Linguistics (pp. 417-424).  
Ure, J. (1971). Lexical density and register 
differentiation. In G. Perren and J.L.M. Trim 
(Eds.), Applications of Linguistics (pp. 443-
452). London: Cambridge University Press.  
Watanabe, H., & Sunayama, W. (2006). Denshi 
keijiban ni okeru yūza no seishitsu no hyōka 
[User nature evalution on BBS] (in Japanese). 
IEICE Technical Report, 105(652), 25-30.
 
Sentence Pattern Extortion for Cyberbullying Detection  
 
 
1108 
Appendix 
Note: For all Appendix tables, best classifier version within each preprocessing kind is in bold.
 
Table A1. Comparison of Best Precision within 
the Threshold Span for Each Version of the 
Classifier for Tokenized Dataset.  
Highest Precision within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.858 0.242 0.377 0.610 
PAT-0P 0.861 0.249 0.387 0.614 
PAT-AMB 0.820 0.491 0.614 0.699 
PAT-LA-0P 0.838 0.150 0.255 0.571 
PAT-LA 0.839 0.143 0.244 0.568 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.755 0.562 0.644 0.697 
NGR-ALL 0.859 0.243 0.378 0.611 
NGR-0P 0.861 0.249 0.387 0.614 
NGR-AMB 0.820 0.491 0.614 0.699 
NGR-LA 0.840 0.144 0.245 0.568 
NGR-LA-0P 0.838 0.150 0.254 0.570 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.754 0.563 0.645 0.697 
Note: Best classifier version within each preprocessing kind is in 
bold. 
 
Table A2. Comparison of Best F-Score Within the 
Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier 
for Tokenized Dataset.  
Highest F-score within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.724 0.842 0.778 0.766 
PAT-0P 0.724 0.842 0.778 0.766 
PAT-AMB 0.690 0.889 0.777 0.751 
PAT-LA-0P 0.697 0.796 0.743 0.73 
PAT-LA 0.656 0.856 0.742 0.709 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.666 0.826 0.738 0.712 
NGR-ALL 0.723 0.842 0.778 0.766 
NGR-0P 0.724 0.841 0.778 0.765 
NGR-AMB 0.690 0.889 0.777 0.751 
NGR-LA 0.654 0.855 0.741 0.708 
NGR-LA-0P 0.696 0.796 0.743 0.730 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.666 0.826 0.737 0.711 
Note: In case of identical results for f-score, the best score was 
optimized for accuracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3. Comparison of best Accuracy Within 
the Threshold Span for Each Version of the 
Classifier for Tokenized Dataset. 
Highest Accuracy within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.724 0.842 0.778 0.766 
PAT-0P 0.785 0.718 0.750 0.766 
PAT-AMB 0.778 0.760 0.769 0.776 
PAT-LA-0P 0.736 0.713 0.724 0.734 
PAT-LA 0.740 0.708 0.723 0.735 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.715 0.703 0.709 0.718 
NGR-ALL 0.723 0.842 0.778 0.766 
NGR-0P 0.784 0.718 0.749 0.766 
NGR-AMB 0.777 0.759 0.768 0.776 
NGR-LA 0.740 0.708 0.723 0.735 
NGR-LA-0P 0.737 0.713 0.725 0.735 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.714 0.702 0.708 0.717 
Note: In case of identical results for f-score, the best score was 
optimized for F-score. 
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Table A5. Comparison of Best Precision Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Lemmatized Dataset. 
Highest Precision within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.871 0.276 0.419 0.627 
PAT-0P 0.871 0.276 0.419 0.627 
PAT-AMB 0.872 0.207 0.334 0.598 
PAT-LA-0P 0.902 0.208 0.338 0.602 
PAT-LA 0.872 0.293 0.438 0.633 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.886 0.236 0.372 0.612 
NGR-ALL 0.887 0.307 0.457 0.642 
NGR-0P 0.886 0.329 0.48 0.651 
NGR-AMB 0.810 0.597 0.687 0.735 
NGR-LA 0.894 0.25 0.391 0.619 
NGR-LA-0P 0.896 0.187 0.31 0.592 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.807 0.609 0.694 0.738 
Table A6. Comparison of Best F-Score Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Lemmatized Dataset. 
Highest F-score within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.715 0.82 0.764 0.753 
PAT-0P 0.715 0.82 0.764 0.753 
PAT-AMB 0.717 0.818 0.764 0.753 
PAT-LA-0P 0.701 0.797 0.746 0.734 
PAT-LA 0.714 0.811 0.76 0.749 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.707 0.789 0.746 0.737 
NGR-ALL 0.713 0.885 0.79 0.77 
NGR-0P 0.713 0.885 0.79 0.769 
NGR-AMB 0.713 0.864 0.781 0.763 
NGR-LA 0.722 0.851 0.781 0.767 
NGR-LA-0P 0.722 0.851 0.781 0.766 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.724 0.818 0.768 0.758 
Table A7. Comparison of Best Accuracy Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Lemmatized Dataset. 
Highest Accuracy within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.765 0.724 0.744 0.756 
PAT-0P 0.765 0.724 0.744 0.756 
PAT-AMB 0.765 0.724 0.744 0.756 
PAT-LA-0P 0.748 0.718 0.732 0.744 
PAT-LA 0.763 0.717 0.740 0.753 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.749 0.717 0.733 0.745 
NGR-ALL 0.787 0.781 0.784 0.790 
NGR-0P 0.785 0.783 0.784 0.789 
NGR-AMB 0.759 0.786 0.772 0.773 
NGR-LA 0.770 0.762 0.766 0.773 
NGR-LA-0P 0.769 0.766 0.768 0.773 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.755 0.771 0.763 0.766 
Note: Best classifier version within each preprocessing kind is in bold 
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Table A9. Comparison of Best Precision Within 
the Threshold Span for Each Version of the 
Classifier for POS-Tagged Dataset. 
Highest Precision within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.776 0.048 0.091 0.518 
PAT-0P 0.776 0.048 0.091 0.518 
PAT-AMB 0.796 0.019 0.037 0.507 
PAT-LA-0P 0.761 0.114 0.198 0.539 
PAT-LA 0.776 0.048 0.091 0.518 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.758 0.119 0.205 0.540 
NGR-ALL 0.917 0.022 0.042 0.510 
NGR-0P 0.917 0.021 0.041 0.510 
NGR-AMB 0.652 0.196 0.302 0.546 
NGR-LA 0.934 0.031 0.060 0.514 
NGR-LA-0P 0.910 0.032 0.062 0.514 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.656 0.308 0.419 0.574 
 
 
Table A10. Comparison of Best F-Score Within 
the Threshold Span for Each Version of the 
Classifier for POS-Tagged Dataset. 
Highest F-score within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.526 0.950 0.677 0.547 
PAT-0P 0.526 0.950 0.677 0.547 
PAT-AMB 0.528 0.946 0.677 0.550 
PAT-LA-0P 0.524 0.952 0.676 0.543 
PAT-LA 0.526 0.950 0.677 0.547 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.526 0.949 0.677 0.547 
NGR-ALL 0.518 0.959 0.672 0.533 
NGR-0P 0.520 0.954 0.673 0.537 
NGR-AMB 0.500 1.000 0.666 0.500 
NGR-LA 0.528 0.935 0.675 0.551 
NGR-LA-0P 0.530 0.930 0.675 0.552 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.565 0.764 0.650 0.588 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A11. Comparison of Best Accuracy Within 
the Threshold Span for Each Version of the 
Classifier for POS-Tagged Dataset. 
Highest Accuracy within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.577 0.779 0.663 0.604 
PAT-0P 0.577 0.779 0.663 0.604 
PAT-AMB 0.578 0.776 0.663 0.605 
PAT-LA-0P 0.639 0.461 0.536 0.600 
PAT-LA 0.577 0.779 0.663 0.604 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.640 0.463 0.537 0.600 
NGR-ALL 0.635 0.528 0.576 0.612 
NGR-0P 0.635 0.527 0.576 0.612 
NGR-AMB 0.545 0.774 0.640 0.564 
NGR-LA 0.624 0.539 0.578 0.607 
NGR-LA-0P 0.626 0.540 0.580 0.609 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.587 0.650 0.617 0.596 
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Table A13. Comparison of Best Precision Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Dataset Containing Tokens with POS Information. 
Highest Precision within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.890 0.336 0.487 0.647 
PAT-0P 0.885 0.342 0.494 0.649 
PAT-AMB 0.873 0.417 0.565 0.678 
PAT-LA-0P 0.868 0.121 0.212 0.551 
PAT-LA 0.868 0.092 0.167 0.539 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.837 0.434 0.572 0.675 
NGR-ALL 0.890 0.336 0.487 0.647 
NGR-0P 0.886 0.344 0.496 0.650 
NGR-AMB 0.873 0.417 0.565 0.678 
NGR-LA 0.868 0.092 0.167 0.539 
NGR-LA-0P 0.868 0.121 0.212 0.551 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.837 0.434 0.572 0.675 
 
Table A14. Comparison of Best F-Score Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Dataset Containing Tokens with POS Information. 
Highest F-score within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.754 0.840 0.795 0.783 
PAT-0P 0.756 0.839 0.796 0.784 
PAT-AMB 0.717 0.844 0.775 0.755 
PAT-LA-0P 0.706 0.767 0.735 0.724 
PAT-LA 0.700 0.775 0.736 0.722 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.709 0.728 0.719 0.715 
NGR-ALL 0.754 0.840 0.795 0.783 
NGR-0P 0.756 0.839 0.796 0.784 
NGR-AMB 0.717 0.844 0.775 0.755 
NGR-LA 0.700 0.775 0.736 0.721 
NGR-LA-0P 0.706 0.768 0.736 0.724 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.709 0.728 0.719 0.715 
 
Table A15. Comparison of Best Accuracy Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Dataset Containing Tokens with POS Information. 
Highest Accuracy within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.809 0.743 0.775 0.784 
PAT-0P 0.756 0.839 0.796 0.784 
PAT-AMB 0.741 0.809 0.774 0.763 
PAT-LA-0P 0.736 0.708 0.722 0.727 
PAT-LA 0.731 0.715 0.723 0.726 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.718 0.710 0.714 0.715 
NGR-ALL 0.809 0.744 0.775 0.784 
NGR-0P 0.756 0.839 0.796 0.784 
NGR-AMB 0.741 0.809 0.774 0.763 
NGR-LA 0.731 0.715 0.723 0.726 
NGR-LA-0P 0.735 0.707 0.721 0.726 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.717 0.710 0.714 0.715 
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Table A17. Comparison of Best Precision Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Dataset Containing Lemmas with POS Information. 
Highest Precision within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.954 0.114 0.204 0.565 
PAT-0P 0.954 0.114 0.204 0.565 
PAT-AMB 0.956 0.119 0.212 0.567 
PAT-LA-0P 0.929 0.200 0.330 0.602 
PAT-LA 0.954 0.114 0.204 0.565 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.929 0.209 0.341 0.606 
NGR-ALL 0.948 0.233 0.374 0.619 
NGR-0P 0.948 0.119 0.212 0.567 
NGR-AMB 0.932 0.205 0.336 0.604 
NGR-LA 0.922 0.197 0.325 0.600 
NGR-LA-0P 0.923 0.167 0.283 0.587 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.892 0.266 0.409 0.626 
Table A18. Comparison of Best F-Score Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Dataset Containing Lemmas with POS Information. 
Highest F-score within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.752 0.817 0.783 0.779 
PAT-0P 0.752 0.817 0.783 0.779 
PAT-AMB 0.759 0.813 0.785 0.782 
PAT-LA-0P 0.725 0.809 0.765 0.756 
PAT-LA 0.752 0.817 0.783 0.779 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.732 0.805 0.766 0.760 
NGR-ALL 0.807 0.798 0.803 0.808 
NGR-0P 0.808 0.795 0.802 0.808 
NGR-AMB 0.754 0.809 0.781 0.778 
NGR-LA 0.733 0.794 0.763 0.756 
NGR-LA-0P 0.720 0.825 0.769 0.757 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.729 0.800 0.763 0.757 
Table A19. Comparison of Best Accuracy Within the Threshold Span for each Version of the Classifier for 
Dataset Containing Lemmas with POS Information. 
Highest Accuracy within threshold 
 
Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.817 0.737 0.775 0.791 
PAT-0P 0.817 0.737 0.775 0.791 
PAT-AMB 0.818 0.733 0.773 0.790 
PAT-LA-0P 0.757 0.765 0.761 0.765 
PAT-LA 0.817 0.737 0.775 0.791 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.762 0.759 0.761 0.766 
NGR-ALL 0.807 0.798 0.803 0.808 
NGR-0P 0.808 0.795 0.802 0.808 
NGR-AMB 0.788 0.764 0.776 0.784 
NGR-LA 0.783 0.738 0.760 0.770 
NGR-LA-0P 0.776 0.760 0.768 0.775 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.729 0.800 0.763 0.757 
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Table A21 Comparison of Best Precision Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Chunk-Separated Dataset. 
Highest Precision within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.852 0.109 0.194 0.548 
PAT-0P 0.845 0.112 0.198 0.548 
PAT-AMB 0.849 0.087 0.158 0.534 
PAT-LA-0P 0.845 0.115 0.202 0.549 
PAT-LA 0.851 0.110 0.195 0.548 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.850 0.088 0.160 0.535 
NGR-ALL 0.848 0.110 0.195 0.547 
NGR-0P 0.873 0.071 0.131 0.532 
NGR-AMB 0.808 0.107 0.188 0.541 
NGR-LA 0.856 0.111 0.197 0.549 
NGR-LA-0P 0.875 0.072 0.133 0.533 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.819 0.106 0.188 0.541 
Table A22. Comparison of Best F-Score Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Chunk-Separated Dataset. 
Highest F-score within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
PAT-0P 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
PAT-AMB 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
PAT-LA-0P 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
PAT-LA 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.490 0.999 0.658 0.490 
NGR-ALL 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
NGR-0P 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
NGR-AMB 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
NGR-LA 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
NGR-LA-0P 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.490 0.999 0.658 0.490 
Table A23. Comparison of Best Accuracy Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Chunk-Separated Dataset. 
Highest Accuracy within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.656 0.587 0.620 0.638 
PAT-0P 0.656 0.587 0.620 0.638 
PAT-AMB 0.644 0.604 0.624 0.631 
PAT-LA-0P 0.658 0.589 0.622 0.640 
PAT-LA 0.655 0.587 0.619 0.638 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.645 0.605 0.625 0.631 
NGR-ALL 0.655 0.586 0.619 0.638 
NGR-0P 0.657 0.586 0.620 0.639 
NGR-AMB 0.606 0.635 0.620 0.613 
NGR-LA 0.656 0.589 0.621 0.639 
NGR-LA-0P 0.657 0.587 0.620 0.639 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.606 0.637 0.621 0.613 
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Table A25. Comparison of Best Precision Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier with 
Dependency Parsed Dataset. 
Highest Precision within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.865 0.070 0.130 0.537 
PAT-0P 0.865 0.070 0.130 0.537 
PAT-AMB 0.860 0.069 0.129 0.537 
PAT-LA-0P 0.866 0.071 0.131 0.537 
PAT-LA 0.868 0.071 0.131 0.537 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.860 0.069 0.129 0.537 
NGR-ALL 0.865 0.071 0.130 0.537 
NGR-0P 0.850 0.070 0.129 0.537 
NGR-AMB 0.860 0.069 0.129 0.537 
NGR-LA 0.865 0.070 0.130 0.537 
NGR-LA-0P 0.862 0.069 0.129 0.537 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.856 0.069 0.128 0.537 
Table A26. Comparison of Best F-Score Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier with 
Dependency Parsed Dataset. 
Highest F-score within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
PAT-0P 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
PAT-AMB 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
PAT-LA-0P 0.491 1.000 0.658 0.491 
PAT-LA 0.491 1.000 0.658 0.491 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.491 1.000 0.658 0.491 
NGR-ALL 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
NGR-0P 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
NGR-AMB 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
NGR-LA 0.491 1.000 0.658 0.491 
NGR-LA-0P 0.491 1.000 0.658 0.491 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.491 1.000 0.658 0.491 
Table A27. Comparison of Best Accuracy Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier with 
Dependency Parsed Dataset. 
Highest Accuracy within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.671 0.336 0.448 0.580 
PAT-0P 0.671 0.336 0.448 0.580 
PAT-AMB 0.659 0.340 0.448 0.574 
PAT-LA-0P 0.671 0.336 0.448 0.580 
PAT-LA 0.670 0.335 0.447 0.579 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.659 0.340 0.449 0.574 
NGR-ALL 0.671 0.336 0.448 0.580 
NGR-0P 0.672 0.335 0.447 0.580 
NGR-AMB 0.659 0.340 0.449 0.574 
NGR-LA 0.671 0.336 0.448 0.580 
NGR-LA-0P 0.672 0.335 0.448 0.580 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.659 0.340 0.449 0.574 
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Table A29. Comparison of Best Precision Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Chunks with NER. 
Highest Precision within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.637 0.165 0.262 0.546 
PAT-0P 0.637 0.167 0.265 0.546 
PAT-AMB 0.644 0.199 0.304 0.551 
PAT-LA-0P 0.540 0.783 0.639 0.545 
PAT-LA 0.592 0.698 0.641 0.543 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.546 0.761 0.635 0.542 
NGR-ALL 0.768 0.242 0.368 0.586 
NGR-0P 0.749 0.251 0.376 0.585 
NGR-AMB 0.724 0.186 0.297 0.558 
NGR-LA 0.736 0.252 0.375 0.582 
NGR-LA-0P 0.730 0.270 0.395 0.585 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.644 0.209 0.315 0.552 
Table A30. Comparison of Best F-Score Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Chunks with NER. 
Highest F-score within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.551 0.902 0.684 0.575 
PAT-0P 0.552 0.903 0.685 0.577 
PAT-AMB 0.541 0.913 0.680 0.565 
PAT-LA-0P 0.508 0.964 0.666 0.511 
PAT-LA 0.507 0.984 0.669 0.515 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.508 0.967 0.666 0.513 
NGR-ALL 0.563 0.879 0.686 0.603 
NGR-0P 0.560 0.864 0.680 0.599 
NGR-AMB 0.554 0.851 0.671 0.587 
NGR-LA 0.579 0.820 0.678 0.616 
NGR-LA-0P 0.546 0.904 0.681 0.583 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.523 0.906 0.664 0.548 
Table 41. Comparison of Best Accuracy Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Chunks with NER. 
Highest Accuracy within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.596 0.668 0.630 0.602 
PAT-0P 0.598 0.670 0.632 0.603 
PAT-AMB 0.593 0.708 0.645 0.602 
PAT-LA-0P 0.540 0.783 0.639 0.545 
PAT-LA 0.592 0.698 0.641 0.543 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.546 0.761 0.635 0.542 
NGR-ALL 0.659 0.647 0.653 0.655 
NGR-0P 0.655 0.646 0.650 0.651 
NGR-AMB 0.622 0.568 0.594 0.613 
NGR-LA 0.625 0.596 0.610 0.623 
NGR-LA-0P 0.626 0.605 0.616 0.625 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.588 0.663 0.624 0.603 
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Table A33. Comparison of Best Precision Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Dependency Parsed Set with NER. 
Highest Precision within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.529 0.160 0.246 0.513 
PAT-0P 0.547 0.167 0.256 0.516 
PAT-AMB 0.611 0.185 0.284 0.531 
PAT-LA-0P 0.513 0.805 0.627 0.529 
PAT-LA 0.513 0.805 0.627 0.528 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.518 0.507 0.513 0.527 
NGR-ALL 0.699 0.100 0.174 0.521 
NGR-0P 0.688 0.101 0.176 0.520 
NGR-AMB 0.619 0.216 0.320 0.536 
NGR-LA 0.718 0.010 0.020 0.513 
NGR-LA-0P 0.708 0.010 0.019 0.513 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.647 0.196 0.301 0.536 
Table A34. Comparison of Best F-Score Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Dependency Parsed Set with NER. 
Highest F-score within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.500 0.983 0.662 0.509 
PAT-0P 0.499 0.980 0.661 0.508 
PAT-AMB 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
PAT-LA-0P 0.499 0.982 0.662 0.509 
PAT-LA 0.499 0.982 0.662 0.509 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.490 0.999 0.657 0.490 
NGR-ALL 0.500 0.981 0.662 0.509 
NGR-0P 0.500 0.982 0.663 0.510 
NGR-AMB 0.490 1.000 0.658 0.490 
NGR-LA 0.500 0.981 0.662 0.509 
NGR-LA-0P 0.500 0.981 0.662 0.509 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.490 0.999 0.657 0.490 
Table A35. Comparison of Best Accuracy Within the Threshold Span for Each Version of the Classifier for 
Dependency Parsed Set with NER. 
Highest Accuracy within threshold 
 Pr Re F1 Acc 
PAT-ALL 0.519 0.766 0.618 0.534 
PAT-0P 0.519 0.769 0.620 0.535 
PAT-AMB 0.611 0.185 0.284 0.531 
PAT-LA-0P 0.513 0.805 0.627 0.529 
PAT-LA 0.513 0.805 0.627 0.528 
PAT-LA-AMB 0.518 0.507 0.513 0.527 
NGR-ALL 0.547 0.615 0.579 0.556 
NGR-0P 0.551 0.617 0.582 0.559 
NGR-AMB 0.533 0.512 0.522 0.540 
NGR-LA 0.548 0.614 0.579 0.557 
NGR-LA-0P 0.549 0.616 0.581 0.558 
NGR-LA-AMB 0.536 0.516 0.526 0.543 
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